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FARMERS OFTEN INDICATE AN INTEREST IN GRAIN FUTURES MARKETS,
both a general interest in how futures influence the price and
marketing of grain, and a specific interest in how they can use futures
in their farming operations. Futures markets are advanced and sophisti-
cated systems of trading in contracts for deferred delivery, and a fairly
high level of knowledge about them is necessary if they are to be used
effectively. At the same time they are basically simple exchange mar-
kets that evolved out of existing commercial needs. The acquisition
of enough knowledge to use futures markets is neither a long nor a
difficult process. The information contained in this bulletin will give
the farmer both a basic and detailed understanding of the futures
markets, and will tell him how he can make effective use of these
markets in connection with his farm business.
There are principally four ways in which farmers can use futures
markets in their farm businesses:
1. To fix the price of a crop before harvest. At any time from
before planting until harvest a farmer can fix, within narrow limits, the
price that he will receive at harvest by selling futures contracts in an
amount equal to the quantity of the crop that he expects to produce.
In a sense, futures markets offer farmers an opportunity to produce on
contract at guaranteed prices.
2. To fix the price of grain in storage for later delivery. The
futures market effectively bids for grain that will be delivered at
various times in the future. Typically these bids are higher as the time
of delivery is more distant. Thus farmers, by selling futures contracts,
can accept the current market price and yet retain possession and be
paid for storage.
3. To fix the cost of feed without taking immediate delivery. Feed-
ers can cover forward requirements by buying futures contracts. They
will, however, indirectly pay someone else to store the feed grain until
they are prepared to accept delivery.
4. To speculate in the price of a crop that has been produced but
for which storage is not available. Frequently farmers wish to retain
ownership of a crop that they have produced even though they do not
have or cannot obtain storage space. They can do so by selling cash
grain and replacing it with futures. However, the increase in the
futures price is typically less than the increase in the price of the cash
grain. If the price of the grain goes down, the futures will go down
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more than the cash. If the change in the general level of price is small,
the futures may actually go down while the cash price is going up.
Thus, indirectly, farmers pay someone else to store for them when
they replace cash with futures.
The key to understanding futures markets may be had through the
study of basis. Basis is the difference between cash and futures prices.
Typically the cash price increases in relation to the futures as the stor-
age season progresses. This narrowing of the basis is equal to the going
market price for storage. The behavior of the basis is fairly consistent
from year to year. It is possible to anticipate basis behavior during
periods in the future and thus read from futures prices the prices that
can be received for cash grain ( for later delivery) if offsetting futures
positions are taken.
Futures markets are not used extensively for transfer of title.
Farmers should never trade in futures expecting to make or take de-
livery. Rather, they should separately trade in futures and apply
profits or losses to the prices received and paid in their usual trans-
action at local elevators.
In our discussion we shall proceed through six steps: (1) descrip-
tion of futures trading, (2) information about how one actually trades,
(3) the economics of futures trading, (4) cash and futures price
relationships, (5) the uses farmers can make of futures, and (6) some
common pitfalls in futures trading.
DESCRIPTION OF FUTURES MARKETS
Futures trading is authorized for many commodities and on several
exchanges. The principal United States exchanges and the commodities
traded in them are as follows:
Exchanges Commodities
Chicago Board of Trade Wheat, corn, oats, rye, soybeans, lard,
cotton, cottonseed oil, soybean oil,
grain sorghums, soybean meal
Chicago Mercantile Exchange . . Butter, eggs, potatoes, frozen broilers,
frozen turkeys
Chicago Open Board of Trade. .Wheat, corn, oats, rye, soybeans
Commodity Exchange, Inc.,
New York Burlap, copper, hides, rubber, zinc
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Kansas City Board of Trade. . . .Wheat, corn, grain sorghums
Memphis Board of Trade Cottonseed meal, soybean meal
Milwaukee Grain Exchange. .. .Wheat, corn, oats, rye
Minneapolis Grain Exchange. . .Wheat, oats, rye, soybeans, flaxseed
New Orleans Cotton
Exchange Cotton
New York Cocoa Exchange. . . .Cocoa
New York Coffee and Sugar
Exchange Coffee, sugar
New York Cotton Exchange . . . Cotton
New York Mercantile
Exchange Potatoes, eggs, butter
New York Produce Exchange . . Cottonseed oil, soybean oil
Seattle Grain Exchange Wheat
St. Louis Merchants Exchange. .Millfeed
Wool Associates of the New
York Cotton Exchange Wool, wool tops
With regard to the grains, the Chicago Board of Trade is by far the
largest market. Kansas City and Minneapolis, as well as Chicago, are
important wheat futures markets. Nearly all of the futures trading in
the other important Illinois-produced grains (corn, soybeans, oats) is
conducted at Chicago.
Futures contract A futures contract is an agreement between two
members of an exchange to buy and sell at a specified time in the future
an agreed amount of a commodity at an agreed price. This contract for
deferred exchange may or may not be finally consummated by an ex-
change of title. It is nevertheless a firm and binding agreement.
The contracts are highly standardized so that most of the terms are
understood and trading can proceed with a minimum of negotiation
and great rapidity. The standard unit of trading is 5,000 bushels of
the major grains. These contracts may be subdivided into smaller units
for the benefit of people who wish to trade in units of less than 5,000
bushels. These "job lots" are in multiples of 1,000 bushels for corn,
soybeans, and wheat, and multiples of 2,000 bushels for oats. The unit
of trading is ]/& of a cent. This amounts to $6.25 per 5,000-bushel
contract.
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Corn Oats Wheat
December July July
March September September
May December December
July March March
September May May
There are various delivery months authorized for trading. These
have been adopted over time out of existing trade practices. For the
four principal grains they are:
Soybeans
September
November
January
March
May
July
August
It is desirable that the months of trading be restricted to less than
12 so that trading does not become spread over so many months that
market liquidity is reduced. The selection of the various months is
logical. For example, July is the main month of winter wheat harvest,
September is the main month of spring wheat harvest, December is the
last month of navigation on the Great Lakes (an important method of
wheat movement), March is the first month in which navigation is open
on the lakes, and May is the last month before new crop harvest.
For each trade the quantity, the month of delivery, and the price
must be agreed upon by negotiation between the two principals. The
rest of the terms of the contract are uniform for all contracts and are
understood. Delivery is to be made at any time in the delivery month
that the seller elects, from the first day to the last.
Delivery is made in store in any one of several public warehouses
designated as "regular" by the Chicago Board of Trade and located
in the rail switching district of Chicago. An exception to this rule is
that delivery may be made, again at the option of the seller, in railroad
boxcars during the last three business days of the delivery month.
No. 2 grade is the quality traded. There are premiums and dis-
counts (fixed by the exchange) if the seller elects to deliver a higher
or lower grade. The terms of payment are cash on delivery of ware-
house receipts. No credit is extended on futures trading.
Pit trading Trading on the Chicago Board of Trade is done in pits.
These are hexagonal structures with steps that lead down into the
center. This arrangement results in maximum visibility for all of the
traders. The place where each trader stands indicates the delivery
month in which he is primarily interested in trading.
Bids and offers are cried out in a sufficiently loud voice for all to
hear. The result is that there is sometimes so much noise that few can
hear and trading is actually done by a system of hand signals. Each
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trader carries a small card on which he records each trade that he
makes. At the end of the day all of the trades are reported to a central
clearing house, and all reported purchases and sales must match up.
At an elevated position overlooking each of the trading pits, there is
stationed a market reporter. He observes each change in price, writes
each new price down, and sends it to a central point near the trading
floor, where it is put on the ticker system for transmission to grain
tickers throughout the world. The whole reporting process takes only
a few seconds.
There are several different kinds of people in the trading pits.
Among them are scalpers, pit traders, position traders, and spreaders.
These people are speculators, attempting to earn money from the
changes in prices. They perform several useful functions: provide
liquidity, assure competition, assure rational price interrelationships,
interpret current market news quickly, etc. On balance their influence
is to make the market a competitive and sensitive pricing device.
Also in the pit are brokers who act on instructions of commission
companies, who in turn act on instructions of customers. Only members
trade. Brokers are the means through which nonmembers, that is, the
general public, become principals in futures market trades.
The exchange The exchange is an association of people whose busi-
nesses are related to the marketing of commodities. The Chicago Board
of Trade, which is our focal point of interest, consists of 1,402 mem-
bers. The membership is limited to this number and is changed only
by special action of the exchange. Memberships are bought and sold
by negotiation between individuals. The price varies and in recent
years has ranged between $3,500 and $8,900. Each prospective
member must be approved by the membership committee of the
exchange.
The Chicago Board of Trade is governed by an elected board of
directors consisting of a chairman, vice chairman, second vice chair-
man, and 15 directors. The principal executive officer is the president,
who is appointed by the board and is paid a salary.
The exchange operates primarily through committees. It includes
such committees as arbitration, business conduct, clearing house, floor
conduct, rules, public information and education, market reports, etc.
These committees formulate policy and guide and direct the activities
of the exchange.
The membership is composed of people whose activities include
every phase of the marketing of grain. They include operators of ter-
minal elevators, interior or country grain merchants, processors of the
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s kinds of grains and soybeans, exporters, commission futures
.ants, brokers, cash-grain merchants, and speculators. The mem-
bersnip is representative of the grain trade, and the exchange is demo-
cratically governed by the membership. The result is a system of checks
and balances on the conditions of futures trading that assures a reason-
ably equal competitive balance among the various conflicting interests.
The exchange has certain general functions. Chief among them are
to (1) provide the facilities for trading, (2) write the rules, (3) super-
vise the trading and enforce the rules, (4) distribute market informa-
tion, including price quotations, and (5) act as a trade association on
behalf of its members in relation to government and the public. It
should be noted that actual trading is absent from this list. The ex-
change itself does not trade in futures contracts. Only members of the
exchange trade.
Governmental regulation Futures trading in grains developed dur-
ing the period from 1848 to 1870. It has had a long history of distrust
and complaints, and consequently there have been many appeals to gov-
ernment for regulation. A thorough investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission in the early 1920's resulted in the Grain Futures Act in
1922 and the establishment of the Grain Futures Administration as a
division of the USDA. There were extensive studies of futures trading
in the 1920's and the early 1930's. They resulted in major amendment
of the Grain Futures Act in 1936, including renaming the act the Com-
modity Exchange Act and the administrative body the Commodity
Exchange Authority.
The major functions of the Commodity Exchange Authority are
(1) licensing of futures exchanges, (2) licensing of brokers and com-
mission futures merchants, (3) audits of the records of commission
futures merchants, (4) surveillance of trading, (5) investigation of
complaints, (6) regulation of the total positions that may be held by
one individual and the volume of trading permitted in one day, and
(7) making and publicizing of market surveys and analyses.
Through these activities the CEA works to prevent the unlawful
practices of price manipulation and market corners. It guards against
fraud, cheating, and manipulation, such as false records of trade, ficti-
tious trades, deception in the execution of orders, failure to execute all
trades in the pits, and improper brokerage practices and misuse of
customers' funds for the broker's own business.
Thus, there are two major supervisory bodies, the exchange and
the Commodity Exchange Authority. The result is that futures mar-
kets are open, competitive, public markets, relatively free of collusion,
monopolistic and manipulative practice, and price fixing.
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HOW ONE TRADES IN FUTURES MARKETS
To trade in futures markets, nonmembers must become customers
of commission futures merchants. There are several of these firms
located at Chicago, and most of them have branch offices in outside
cities. Branch offices of the different firms are located throughout Illi-
nois so that there is one not too far from any point in the state.
The customer signs an agreement with the commission futures
merchant authorizing him to execute trades and makes a deposit of
funds to guarantee performance on the contracts. The agreement is
usually fairly long and in fine print. The new customer should read
the agreement carefully so that he fully understands the rules under
which he must operate.
There is no reason for distrust of commission futures merchants.
They are licensed by the USDA and are closely supervised both by the
government and the exchange. The customers' agreements are essen-
tially the same for all firms, and the charges are uniform and set by the
exchange. Commission firms will undertake to execute any kind of
order that the customer places provided they can clearly understand
what the customer wants.
There are several different kinds of orders that customers place.
The simplest is the market order; it instructs the broker to buy or sell,
as the case may be, immediately at the most advantageous price. The
broker tries to buy or sell at the most recently traded price. If no one
accepts, he bids the price up or offers at lower prices until someone
does accept. Thus, the trade may be executed at a price a little bit
away from the last traded price. The second kind of order is a limit
order. In this case the customer tells the broker to buy if he can get as
low a price as, say, $1.41^ or sell if he can get as much as $1.41^.
Limit orders may be placed at the last traded price, near it, or several
cents away. Third is the stop loss order. Here a customer who has
previously bought says to sell out at the market if the price goes down
to such and such a figure. The opposite kind of stop loss is used when
the customer has previously sold. The purpose of the stop loss order is
to limit a threatened loss or to insure an existing profit. Fourth is a
spread order, which is used when a customer wishes to buy one delivery
month and simultaneously sell another. He instructs the company to
buy, say, March and sell May at a premium of (no more than) three
cents. There are various reasons for placing such an order. These will
be discussed below. More complicated orders can be placed, but these
are enough to make the point that the commission merchant will take
any order that he can understand and readily execute.
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Market orders are processed and executed with great speed. In one
trial run, without advance warning that it was being timed, a market
order was placed at a branch office 150 miles from Chicago. Forty-two
seconds later the customer was handed a slip of paper indicating the
price at which the trade had been made. To make the actual trade took
only 12 seconds. This is an unusually fast time, but a minute is con-
sidered a long time for execution.
Long and short A position in a futures market can be either long or
short. To be long is to have a contract to purchase, accept delivery, and
pay for a commodity later. It is to have an inventory purchased for
deferred delivery. If an individual purchases 5,000 bushels of July
corn at $1.15, he will, unless he takes some offsetting action in the
meantime, receive and pay for a warehouse receipt indicating owner-
ship of 5,000 bushels of corn in store in a public warehouse in the City
of Chicago sometime during the month of July. If, by the time delivery
is made, the price has gone up, say, to $1.20, he can sell the corn for
more than he paid for it and thus make a profit. If the price is lower, he
must take less if he sells and thus sustain a loss. The long makes
money if the price goes up.
To be short is to have a contract to sell, deliver, and accept payment
for a commodity later. It is to owe inventory for deferred delivery. If
an individual sells 5,000 bushels of July corn at $1.15, he must, unless
he takes some offsetting action in the meantime, deliver the actual corn
in Chicago sometime during the month of July. If, by July, the price
has gone up, say, to $1.20, he would have been able to sell his corn for
more than the contracted price and thus will sustain a loss. If the price
is lower, he will have made a good sale and thus will make a profit.
The short makes money if the price goes down.
If an individual sells something, anything, for more than he paid for
it, he makes a profit. Whether he buys it first and then sells it or sells it
first and then buys it makes no difference.
In a futures market, for every long there is a short. You cannot
buy a contract unless someone else sells a contract. If there are con-
tracts to buy and take delivery of 103 million bushels of wheat, there
must also be contracts to sell and make delivery of 103 million bushels.
Offsetting contracts As we shall note in a later section, futures con-
tracts usually serve purposes other than the transfer of title of
commodities. Most contracts never mature, but instead are offset.
During the decade from July 1950 through June 1960, only 7.4 percent
of the wheat futures contracts and 7.3 percent of the soybean futures
contracts traded were settled by actual delivery.
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Contracts are offset by making opposite transactions. Suppose that
during February a customer of a commission house sells 5,000 bushels
of July corn at $1.15. He is short, committed to sell and deliver. Sup-
pose further that the price goes down to $1.12. He reads that the
Argentine corn crop has turned out to be less than was earlier esti-
mated. From this information he reasons that the price of corn will
go up. He wishes that he could now buy the 5,000 bushels that he is
committed to sell and deliver in July for $1.12. So he does. He simply
buys 5,000 bushels of July corn at $1.12. He is now short 5,000
bushels for July delivery and long 5,000 bushels for July delivery.
From this time forward what he makes on one side he will lose on the
other.
He does not need to wait until July to receive from one and pay
the other. In fact he is not allowed to wait. There is no reason to
have both contracts cluttering up the records. The second is offset
against the first and the whole business is canceled. All that remains is
to settle the monetary difference. He sold for $1.15 and bought for $1.12
and so has three cents a bushel, or $150 due him. From this total must
be subtracted a commission fee of $22, leaving a net of $128. This
amount is posted to his account with the commission futures merchant.
Incidentally, commission is charged on a package basis, with one fee
covering both the original and offsetting transaction.
Clearing house The volume of trading greatly exceeds the amount
delivered. Individuals can offset contracts at will. These things to-
gether complicate settlement procedure. In our example above, our
broker may have traded with a broker who was acting for a housewife
in Sacramento, California. When we decided to offset, it would have
been difficult to negotiate with the housewife. Instead our broker
bought from the highest bidder at that moment, say a corn alcohol dis-
tiller. This bouncing around can and does go on for several trades.
How is it all finally settled so that money is paid to and received
from the appropriate people?
It is done through a device called the Clearing House. The Clearing
House is a subordinate organization of the exchange. At the end of
each day's business, the Clearing House becomes a party to all trades.
It becomes the buyer to all sellers and the seller to all buyers. It is
thus in a position to match all offsetting contracts, charging the ac-
counts of all traders who have lost money and crediting the accounts of
all who have gained. Thus contracts become highly impersonal and
readily negotiable. (The above is an oversimplification of clearing
procedures.)
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Lest we leave an erroneous impression, we should emphasize that
futures contracts are binding, enforceable contracts. If the buyer
wishes to take delivery, he can simply stay long until delivery is made.
He must either offset by selling or take delivery and pay for the grain.
The opposite is true of the seller. He must either make an offsetting
purchase or deliver the grain at the agreed price.
Margin Each customer of a commission merchant and each member
of the Clearing House must make a deposit of funds, called margin, to
guarantee performance on contracts.
The Clearing House is liable for the transactions that it has
accepted from its members. It guarantees performance on all contracts.
There is never the slightest doubt but that the customer will either
receive his profits or pay his losses.
The commission merchant is liable to the Clearing House for the
trades of his customers. Under the rules of the exchange, the commis-
sion merchants must require certain minimum margin deposits from
their customers. The exchange establishes the amount of minimum
deposit. The merchant may, at his discretion, require larger than mini-
mum deposits. The amount of the margin tends to be about 10 percent
of the value of the commodity, although there may be large deviations
depending on the commodity and market conditions. It may be as little
as 5 percent or as large as 20 percent. It is generally set at the lowest
level that the exchange thinks is a safe guarantee.
In addition to the initial margin requirement, a maintenance margin
is also required. The maintenance margin is the amount below which
the position value must not be allowed to fall. There is a tendency for
the maintenance margin to be set at about 75 percent of the original
margin.
The commission merchant may call for additional margins at his
discretion, but whenever the customer's margins are depleted below the
minimum, he must call for additional margins; and if within a reason-
able time the customer fails to bring his margins up to the minimum
requirement, the broker must close out the customer's trades in an
amount sufficient to bring the margin deposit up to the minimum
requirement.
The maintenance margin brings up a concept of profits and losses
that needs to be understood before the margin system becomes clear.
Profits and losses are realized as the market value of the commodity
goes up and down, even though the contract is still in effect. It is
against the current position value that maintenance margins are com-
puted. Suppose that a customer buys 5,000 bushels of July corn at
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$1.25. The initial margin requirement is five cents a bushel, or $250,
and the maintenance margin is four cents a bushel, or $200. If the cus-
tomer deposits the minimum initial margin, the account value at the
outset is $250. Suppose that on the first day the price goes up one cent.
The customer could, if he wished, sell at a profit of one cent, or $50.
The account value is $300. Suppose that on the second day the price
goes down li/2 cents for a loss of $75. The account value is now $225.
Suppose on the third day the price goes down one cent for a loss of
$50. The account value is now $175, which is less than the mainte-
nance margin of $200. The commission merchant must now contact
the customer and call for an additional margin deposit. If the customer
fails to respond, the commission merchant must sell out the position.
If this is accomplished at the current price, the merchant subtracts his
commission of $22 and will, if asked, remit the balance of $153 to the
customer. In short, the original position is guaranteed by a margin
deposit, but the contract is kept guaranteed by the provision of mainte-
nance margins.
THE ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING
Up to this point we have been describing futures trading as an
activity. We now turn our attention to what it does as an economic
institution— to the purposes it serves in the marketing of commodities,
especially grains.
This system has developed and persists because it serves useful
economic functions. It adds to the productivity of the economic proc-
esses; it adds to the utility that the marketing system provides. If this
were not so, it would not have been continued in use as a part of the
system of grain marketing system for about 100 years. Had there been,
by this time, a better method of accomplishing the jobs that futures
trading performs, such a method would have been adopted.
Futures trading is an important part of the commercial world.
Contracts are real contracts involving actual grain. If the long stays
long, he will get delivery; and if the short stays short, he must make
delivery. Thus the factors affecting futures prices are the same as
those affecting prices of cash grain. And the factors affecting the
trading in futures contracts are the same as those affecting the trading
in cash grains.
A brief look at the origin of futures trading will be helpful at this
point. The system evolved gradually between 1850 and 1870 at Chicago.
The Illinois-Michigan Canal linking the Illinois River and Lake Michi-
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gan was opened in 1848. There immediately sprang up businesses
along the river which engaged in buying corn from farmers for ship-
ment to the rapidly growing village of Chicago. They had to buy the
corn from farmers during the winter when the country roads were
frozen and passable. Unfortunately, they could not immediately ship
the corn to Chicago because when the roads were frozen so were the
river and canal. They had to pay cash for the corn and hold it in
storage until the spring.
Most of these merchants used up all of their own capital in building
the cribs. Their bankers were not enthusiastic about lending them
money to buy the farmers' corn when they had to take a chance on
what would happen to the price during the months that the corn was
in storage. These merchants thus quickly developed the practice of
going to Chicago and selling corn to Chicago merchants for delivery
in the spring. These contracts were made at firm prices. Thus the
country merchants were no longer subject to the risks of changes in
prices. The first record of one of these contracts was found in the
newspapers in early 1851.
The country merchants found that the Chicago corn merchants were
not always the highest bidders. Sometimes other people not connected
with the trade in grain would bid more. These people were financiers,
building contractors, lawyers, etc.
During the mid-1850's prices rose sharply and varied greatly because
of war in Crimea. Later the Civil War put great demands on the
Chicago corn trade, and prices rose further and became highly variable.
Trade in forward contracts for grain became quite brisk, some con-
tracts changing hands several times before delivery was actually made.
The general public as well as the grain merchants became heavily
involved in this trade.
By the late 1860's the contracts were standardized, the time and
place of trading were regularized, and trading rules were adopted.
From this beginning futures trading evolved and developed into its
present form. The trading in wheat followed closely behind that of
corn. Trading in butter and eggs evolved during the period from 1900
to 1920, and in soybean oil and soybean meal during 1946 to 1951. The
histories of futures trading of these commodities are similar. In each
instance existing practices of forward contracting were codified into
formal futures trading.
The exact point at which the informal trading in futures contracts
became futures trading cannot be identified. They are, in essence, the
same thing. The need arose for shifting the risks of price change from
the storers of inventory to people better able to finance the inventories
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and sustain the losses involved in assuming price risks. In short, a
system for shifting risks evolved.
Five functions of futures trading should be listed: (1) publicity
and information, (2) regulatory, (3) financing, (4) risk shifting, and
(5) pricing.
Publicity and information The widespread interest in futures trad-
ing and the precision with which futures prices are quoted results
in more extensive publicizing of prices than would probably otherwise
exist. Futures trading also results in the development and dissemina-
tion of a lot of market information about production, use, receipts,
shipments, storage stocks, etc. There is probably more of this informa-
tion available than would otherwise exist. The more that is known
about trading and the conditions affecting trading, the more competitive
a market becomes. Competition in markets is useful in assuring fair
treatment for all.
Regulatory Futures trading is closely regulated, both by the ex-
changes and by the USDA. Such regulation tends to reduce the
possibility of price manipulation and the exercise of monopolistic posi-
tions. Insofar as regulation assures a better balance of power, com-
petition is increased. Futures trading is much more closely regulated
than cash trading. Practices that are illegal in futures markets are legal
in cash markets.
Financing A substantial proportion of the cost of marketing is the
financing of inventories. Shifting risks of ownership away from
inventory holders greatly reduces the cost of capital needed to carry
inventories. Specifically, a high proportion of the money needed to
carry hedged inventories— say 90 percent— can be borrowed at mini-
mum interest rates. The proportion that can be borrowed on unhedged
inventories is smaller, and the interest rate higher.
Risk shifting Futures trading, as we have seen, developed because
of the needs of merchants to shift the risks of price changes. Risks
are shifted by the process of hedging. To hedge is to take a posi-
tion in futures equal and opposite to an already existing cash position.
If a merchant has a stock of 100,000 bushels of corn in his elevator,
he is long cash corn. If the price goes up, he makes money. If it
goes down, he loses money. He is subject to the risk of a price de-
cline. He can offset this risk by selling 100,000 bushels of futures
contracts. By selling, he becomes short futures. He is thus long cash
and short futures; he is hedged. So long as cash and futures prices
move up and down together, what the hedger makes on the one position
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he will lose on the other, and thus he will neither gain nor lose from
a change in price.
Our hedger has shifted the price risk of ownership to the pur-
chaser of the futures contracts. Thus the process of hedging is the
shifting of risks from people who have inventory positions (either
long or short) in cash grain to the people who are on the opposite end
of the offsetting futures contracts.
We can best see the nature of the risk-shifting process by looking
at the open interest. The open interest is the amount of unoffset com-
mitments in futures. It is the quantity of a commodity represented
by outstanding contracts. The Commodity Exchange Authority re-
quires that each person whose position exceeds 200,000 bushels report
daily the nature of the position and whether he is hedging or speculat-
ing. The sum of these reports is published. We thus have a knowledge
of the structure of the open interest as it is divided into three cate-
gories: (1) reporting hedgers, (2) reporting speculators, and (3) non-
reporting traders. Special surveys of the market show that nonreporting
traders are predominantly speculators.
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the net positions of the three categories
of traders in soybean futures for the three years from mid-1958
through mid-1961. The net positions were obtained by subtracting
the short from the long if the category was net long and vice versa if
the category was net short.
At the beginning of each crop year, the positions of all three were
quite small. At the time of harvest, the short position of hedgers built
up very rapidly. For every short there must be a long. The long posi-
tions of the reporting speculators and nonreporting traders also
increased rapidly. All positions tended to reach their peak levels soon
after the end of harvest and subsequently gradually declined until the
next harvest.
The regularity of this pattern results from the pattern of hedging.
Farmers sell soybeans more rapidly at harvest than they can be used.
Processors and warehousemen accumulate large inventories (long) of
cash soybeans. They hedge by selling (short) futures contracts. Proc-
essors and warehousemen regularly hedge their cash inventories. Their
position in futures is a mirror (opposite) image of their cash position.
The pattern is not precisely the same each year. In 1960 to 1961 the
open interest did not reach a peak until the end of February. Farmers
sold a large quantity of soybeans at harvest and continued to be liberal
sellers after harvest so that processors' stocks did not reach a peak
until later than usual. As soybeans are processed and exported, the
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Table 1.— Month-End Net Position of Reporting Hedgers, Reporting
Speculators, and Nonreporting Traders, All Soybean Futures,
July 1958 to August 1961
Month
Nonreporting Reporting Reporting
traders speculators hedgers
(thousands of bushtils)
+ 740 +5,810 -6,550
-289 +6,145 -5,856
+2,954 +9,314 -9,314
+36,914 + 15,438 -52,352
+40,431 + 15,378 -55,809
+32,956 + 13,599 -46,555
+30,699 + 11,507 -42,206
+22,828 + 11,329 -34,157
+ 17,664 +8,331 -25,995
+ 14,192 +5,232 -19,424
+9,403 +432 -8,971
-537 +3,102 -2,565
+ 10,651 +6,025 -16,676
+ 1,636 +3,815 -5,451
+3,595 + 1,072 -4,667
+30,576 + 12,603 -43,179
+67,840 +8,101 -75,941
+60,195 + 11,127 -71,322
+63,906 +7,677 -71,583
+57,219 + 1,621 -58,840
+44,436 -1,627 -43,836
+29,083 -2,271 -26,812
+ 26,061 -7,826 -18,235
+ 13,577 -5,069 -8,508
+6,190 +3,640 -9,830
+8,187 +2,570 -10,757
+21,704 +5,181 -26,885
+61,104 + 29,308 -90,412
+68,857 +21,833 -90,690
+62,357 +37,130 -99,487
+83,052 +34,940 -117,992
+81,173 +41,721 -122,894
+71,776 +38,709 -110,485
+50,605 +33,797 -84,402
+36,243 +20,793 -57,036
+ 12,849 + 16,907 -29,766
+7,868 +4,395 -12,263
-88 -970 + 1,058
1958
July
August
September
October ,
November ,
December
1959
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
,
November
December
1960
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1961
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
+ = Long
— = Short
Source: USDA, CEA
hedgers buy back the futures contracts that they sold in hedging. This
accounts for the pattern of decline in their short positions.
The long positions opposite the short positions of hedgers are held
by speculators. The succession of events is that, at harvest, farmers
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Net positions of the three categories of traders in soybean futures for the
three years from mid-1958 through mid-1961. The data for this figure are
found in Table 1. (Fig. 1)
sell to country elevators, who sell to processors and others, who hedge.
Hedging is, in effect, a matter of selling to speculators. Thus risks of
price change are shifted from farmers, through the marketing system,
to speculators in futures markets.
It is useful to regard the reporting speculators as a balance wheel
in the open interest. They pick up the risks that the nonreporting
traders do not want, and they supply the nonreporting traders by going
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short when the supply of hedges is less than nonreporting traders wish
to be long.
The major part of the hedges is carried by nonreporting traders,
who are, in fact, the speculating public. A special survey 1 of the open
contracts in soybeans futures as of November 30, 1959, listed the
occupations of 7,311 speculators active on that day. About 1,000 of
them were directly connected with grain marketing as operators of
elevators, exporters, processors, etc. The largest single group, 1,617,
were farmers. There were also doctors, dentists, lawyers, chemists,
engineers, teachers, television operators, bankers, salesmen, clerical
workers, machinists, private detectives, housewives, students, retired,
and unemployed, to mention only part of the list. These are the risk
takers.
The essence of this discussion is to point out that the main thing
futures trading does is to shift risk from hedgers of cash inventories
to speculators in futures markets. Futures market speculators are
essential to the operation of a hedging system. It is generally agreed
that hedging reduces the cost of operation of grain marketing firms
and processors. The system succeeds in shifting risks of price varia-
tion from people who are not in a position to speculate to people who
are in a position and wish to speculate.
Pricing The speculative pricing function of futures trading is a
secondary or derived one. But it is perhaps a more important function
than risk shifting. Speculation should and does influence prices.
Prices of seasonally produced commodities are speculative. The supply
that is harvested during a short period of time must be made to last
until the next crop is available. At the same time, the supply must be
used down to a small carryover to the following year. This job of
rationing the supply is a function of the price. There is one and only
one average price that will make the supply just clear the market. If
the price is held at higher levels, some of the users will be priced out
of the market and there will be more than a necessary carry-over. If
the price is held at lower than the equilibruim level, additional users
will be drawn into the market and the supply will not last until the
next harvest.
When allowed to work, market prices effectively accomplish the
necessary job of rationing. No matter how short the crop, we never
run out. Enough users get priced out of the market to leave something
when the new crop is harvested. No matter how large the increase in
the crop, new users are brought into the market by bargain prices; and
1 USDA, CEA, Soybean Futures Trading, 1959 to I960, p. 17.
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even though there is a substantial carry-over, the expanded use makes
an inventory to add to the supply for the next year appear desirable.
From this explanation it is apparent that at all times there are two
kinds of demands. One is demand for current use and the other is
demand for inventory to be used at a future time. If it appears that
the supply is short at the current price, the demand for inventory
increases, bidding prices up and slowly down the rate of use. If it
appears that the supply is so large that it will not be used before the
next harvest at the current price, the demand for inventory decreases,
reducing prices and speeding up the rate of use.
At any given time the price is the result of interplay of the two
forces and just strikes a balance between them. Thus, in the short run
the price depends on the decisions of inventory holders. The question
that an inventory holder asks it simple: "Shall I sell or hold?" His
answer depends upon whether he thinks the price is going up or down.
The inventory holder must forecast prices. He must look ahead and
appraise the effect on price of changes in supply and in requirements
for various uses. This is a very complicated and difficult job, as is well
known to all people, farmers in particular, who have tried to un-
scramble the price outlook.
At any given time the price at which inventories are held out of use
is the result of a balance of judgments of the holders of inventories.
On the one side the people who think the price is going up hold, and
on the other side the people who think the price is going down sell.
If the balance of judgments is that the price is going down, selling
quickly puts it down, and vice versa. All things that are expected to
affect the price in the future are quickly discounted into the current
price so that it reflects the composite judgment of the equilibrium price.
Thus the composite judgment of all of the market participants is that
the price will not change.
Obviously they are always wrong. Prices do change. This is be-
cause some things are not yet foreseeable, because the market does not
foresee all of the things that are foreseeable, and because the market
does not weigh properly the things that it does foresee. If the market
were omniscient, able to foresee all things and weigh them properly, the
price would never change. Changes in price thus are the result of
speculative error.
The owners of inventory are speculators. They have taken a posi-
tion at the risk of loss and in the hope of profit. He who holds an
inventory is speculating. He is pitting his judgment about the direction
of price change against the market by deciding to hold rather than sell.
If he is right, he makes money; if wrong, he loses.
1963] Grain Futures Markets in Farm Business 21
This is a somewhat different concept of profit and loss than the
usual accounting one. Here, profits and losses may be finally realized
or may be interim profits and losses that are finally offset by larger
price changes in the opposite direction. Such interim profits and losses
are nonetheless real. If the trading is in futures, losses must be covered
by the posting of additional margin, and profits can be withdrawn
before the trade is closed out. Farmers should reckon interim profits
and losses from storing cash grain from the price that they could have
obtained when the grain was placed in storage.
The most important speculators are farmers. They hold more of
the inventory than any other group. Probably the second most impor-
tant inventory-controlling group are speculators in futures markets.
Basically they are long the amount that hedgers are short. Hedgers,
being both long and short, do nothing more than act as custodians.
Until users outbid speculators, hedgers must hold grain in store. The
hedgers buy back their short futures contracts so that they can sell
the cash commodities to users.
In addition to being a risk-shifting medium, futures trading is a
system of discounting expectations into current prices. The test of a
speculative market is in price variation. It must work toward stability
of price. The test of a particular system of speculative pricing, such as
futures trading, is in whether the resulting price variation is greater
or less than it would be in the absence of the system.
The effect of futures trading has been much argued, but with no
final conclusions. 1 One thing, however, is clear: The price of grain at
harvest is higher with futures trading than it would be without it.
As is clear from Fig. 1, speculators buy from hedgers at harvest. They
pay more than the price at which hedgers are willing to accept the risk
of ownership. If this were not so, hedgers would not hedge.
A frequent question is, "Why should the hodgepodge of people
identified as the speculating public be qualified to establish prices?"
What a speculator is trying to do is forecast price. If he does this
better than the average of all the people who speculate, he will make
money; if not, he will lose. Losing money is a discouraging thing.
The chronic losers quit, and those who profit stay and trade in larger
volume. Futures markets act as continuous spell-downs of speculators.
It is not illogical that a physician, teacher, or machinist may be a
competent forecaster— it is just unlikely. But very few of all people
in a particular occupation speculate in commodities. The market has
sorted them out and kept only the good ones.
1 For a fairly complete discussion, see Bakken, Gray, Paul, and Hieronymus,
Futures Trading Seminar, MIMIR, Madison, Wisconsin, 1960, Part 3.
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CASH AND FUTURES PRICE RELATIONSHIP
The key to the effective use of futures markets by farmers is under-
standing the relationship of cash and futures prices. While these
relationships are variable, they are systematic so that they can be fore-
cast within fairly close limits.
Basis The basis is the price of cash grain at the delivery point in rela-
tion to the nearby or dominant futures. If in February we say that the
corn basis is 2 over, we mean that No. 2 yellow corn at Chicago is
selling for 2 cents more than the March futures.
Statements of basis can be modified by location and by time. For
example, we can say that the east-central Illinois basis is 7 under, or
the New Orleans basis is 14 over, in these instances designating a
location different from the delivery point but again referring to the
nearby future. It is sometimes useful to refer to the cash price in
relation to a more distant future. For example, in October we may
be concerned with the price of soybeans at local elevators in relation
to the May future. In this case we would say that the farm basis is
20 under the May. The important basis is the one that applies to the
individual user. It is important that the user of futures markets become
familiar with the changes in his own local basis.
Cash and futures prices During the delivery month, at the delivery
point, cash and futures must be equal. If on March 1 cash corn were
5 cents below the March future, merchants would buy cash corn,
sell futures, and make a profit of 5 cents. Such an obvious thing
would be quickly erased by the actions of many people. Similarly if
cash corn were 5 cents above futures, the users of cash corn would
buy futures and take delivery as the cheapest source of supply. Thus,
lacking demand, the cash would quickly decline.
But the cash price is typically higher than the futures at Chicago
during the delivery month. This fact does not violate the principle
stated above. It results from certain technical differences in the value
of cash grain in boxcars and grain taken on delivery of futures con-
tracts. These differences have to do with the time of delivery, quality
of the grain, place of delivery, loading-out charges, and freight rate
structure. This Chicago difference is not of concern to farmer users
of futures.
The forcing of cash and futures together during the delivery month
forces futures prices to reflect values that exist in the trading of cash
grain. Because of the delivery provision for futures contracts, prices
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of cash and futures, and futures for different delivery months, are
functionally related.
Theory of the carrying charge The theory of the carrying charge is
that, because there are costs of storing cash grain and there are
virtually no costs in holding futures contracts, cash prices gain in
relation to the futures during the storage period. Costs of storing
cash grain include the investment in and depreciation of the structure;
operating costs, such as labor, repairs, and maintenance of quality;
property taxes; and interest on funds tied up in cash grain. Thus the
price of grain at harvest should be below the futures by the cost of
storing until the maturity of the future.
Fig. 2 illustrates this theory. It relates to corn. The price during
the planting and growing season is below the December future by the
cost of storing from harvest until December. The December, in turn,
is below the March by the cost of storing from December to March,
etc.
Locational differences The second part of the theory of the relation-
ship of cash and futures is that the difference in prices at locations
away from the delivery point depends upon transportation cost and the
place of the outside location in the flow stream of grain.
Fig. 3 illustrates three major kinds of locational differences. The
first case is one in which the local price is under the delivery point price
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DECEMBER
CASH
^X
PLANTING HARVEST
An illustration of the basis theory as it relates to corn. The price of grain
at harvest is below the futures by the cost of storing until the maturity of
the future. (Fig. 2)
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An illustration of the location theory showing three different kinds of loca-
tional differences. (Fig. 3)
by the cost of transportation to the delivery point (when the flow of
market grain is to the delivery point market). This illustration involves
corn from northern Illinois. The main flow of corn from the area is
to Chicago. Thus the local price tends to be equal to the Chicago price
minus freight. This is the most regular and dependable basis relation-
ship.
The second case is that of equalization to a common destination.
Let us say that during most of the year Chicago ships corn to Baltimore
for export and that central Ohio points also ship corn to Baltimore for
export. The price in central Ohio will be higher than the Chicago price
by the difference between the freight cost between Ohio and Baltimore
and Chicago and Baltimore. This relationship holds exactly only so
long as both points ship to Baltimore (or some other common destina-
tion). If a local shortage develops in Ohio, corn will be priced too high
to move to Baltimore and the Ohio price will exceed Chicago by a
larger than usual amount.
The third case can be called multiple destination. It is best illus-
trated by the situation in east-central Illinois. Corn moves from this
area to many major destinations, including Illinois processors, Peoria,
St. Louis, Kentucky, Georgia, New Orleans, Baltimore, and Chicago.
These are the most important ones, but there are others. When Chicago
is the best outlet, the price is under Chicago by the transportation cost.
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When other destinations are better, the price will be closer to Chicago
than the transportation cost. Out of the multiplicity of destinations
can come considerable price variation in relation to Chicago. Even so,
this variation nearly always remains within a narrow and predictable
range.
Actual basis Having looked at the theoretical pattern of the basis and
price relationships among the various futures contracts, we now turn
our attention to the actual structure. Table 2 and Figs. 4 and 5 show
the prices and price interrelationships for corn during the 1960 to 1961
crop season. Fig. 5 is the same as Fig. 4 except that the July future
was set at zero and the other prices were plotted in relation to it. This
process takes out the variation in the level of corn prices and makes
possible a clear picture of the interrelationship.
The first general observation is that cash and futures prices tend
to move up and down together. Week-to-week changes are nearly
always in the same direction, and major changes are of the same
general magnitude. The second general observation is that the general
pattern of the basis chart (Fig. 5) is the same as that of the theoretical
pattern (Fig. 2). At the same time there are major differences and
a considerable amount of erratic behavior. We must concern ourselves
with these departures from the norm.
At the outset of harvest, the price was discounted from the loan by
an amount roughly equal to the cost of storage from fall until the end
of July. The Chicago cash price was the usual 12 cents over the east-
central Illinois farm price. The various futures were above the cash
and were related to each other by approximately the cost of storage.
As we moved into harvest, it became apparent that the crop was
larger than expected, so there would be a substantial crib overrun to be
sold and stored off farms. The crop was also wet, further complicating
the storage problem. The entire price structure declined. It should be
especially noted that three things happened: the price went down, the
spreads among the futures increased, and the cash discount under the
futures increased. The decline in the price of July corn was the same
as the decrease in level of prices, or 5 J/4 to 6 cents. The widening of
the spreads and the decrease in cash prices in excess of 5^i to 6 cents
was really an increase in the going market price of storage. Put differ-
ently, the farm price decrease was 14 cents, of which about 6 cents was
a decrease in price and 8 cents was an increase in the price of storing
corn.
After the harvest low, the price level of corn varied considerably,
but the price interrelationships were fairly consistent with the theoreti-
cal patterns.
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Table 2.— Prices of Cash Corn at Country Elevators, Cash Corn
to Arrive Chicago, and December, March, May,
and July Futures, Weekly, 1960-61
Date
East- No. 2
central Yellow
Illinois to Dec. March May July
farm arrive
price Chicago
96 107/ 110/ 114H 1[16% 118/
96 109M 110% 1143/g 1[16% 118/
96 108% 109% 113% 1L16% 118%
95/ 108 109% 113% 1[16% 118%
96 109J4 109% 113/ 1[16/ 118%
95 107/ 108% 112/ 1L15% 117%
94 107 108 112 1115 117/
94 107% 109% 113 J* [16% 118%
92 102% 107% 112% L15% 117/
90/ 102J4 107% 112% 1L15% 118
86/ 99 105% 110/ 1 14% 117%
82 91 100% 106% 1 101/8 113
83 953^ 102% 107% 1Ul% 114%
88 99 103% 108/ 3112/8 114%
93/ 101% 1043>4 109% [12% 115/
96/ 103% 104 108% [12% 114/
98 1073^ 109% !113% 115/
99 108% 109% :[13 116
100/ 110/ 112 1il5% 118%
100 110% 111% ush 118%
100/ 111% 111/ [15/2 118%
103 114% 114 1[17% 120/
107/ 117% 117% 1L21% 125
105/ 115/ 115/ 1[19/8 123
103 112/ 113% 1L17% 121/
105 113% 114% 1 18% 122%
104 114/ 114 1[17/s 121/
105 117 115% [18/8 121%
104 116 113/ [16% 119/
103/ 112 [15/ 119%
95/ 105/ [09/ 112%
97 108 [09% 113/
100 108/ 108/ 112%
102 113/ [11% 115%
103 114% [H/8 116/
102 113% ill/ 115/
103/ 114/ [14 117%
103 113/ [12/ 116
103/ 114% 115%
104 1/6 116 116%
103 114 115
101 112% 113%
101 113% 113%
102 113/ 113%
102 115/ 113/
104 J/6 115/ 114%
103 115% 113%
1960
Sept. 2
.
9.
16.
23.
30.
Oct 7.
14.
21.
28.
Nov. 4
.
11.
18.
25.
Dec. 2
9.
16.
23.
30.
1961
Jan. 6.
13.
20.
27.
Feb. 3
10.
17.
24.
March 3.
10.
17.
24.
31.
April 7.
14.
21.
28.
May 5.
12.
19.
26.
June 2.
9.
16.
23.
30.
July 7.
14.
20.
Source: Current market reports.
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Prices and price relationships for corn during the 1960-61 crop season.
Figures shown are weekly prices of cash corn at country elevators, cash
corn to arrive at Chicago, and December, March, May, and July futures.
(Fig. 4)
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Prices and price relationships for corn during the 1960-61 crop season.
The information given is the same as that in Fig. 4 except that the July
future was set at zero and the other prices were plotted in relation to it.
(Fig. 5)
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It is thus apparent that basis behavior is generally consistent with
basis theory but is specifically variable. Accordingly we have developed
basis charts for the four principal Illinois-produced grains for seven
crop years and have averaged them together to give a composite
view. The results are shown in Figs. 6 through 9, and the data
are included in Appendix Tables 1 through 4. In each case the first
delivery month applicable to each crop year and the last month not
affected by new crop conditions were used. The period for the basis
charts extended from before planting for corn, soybeans, and oats and
from January 1 before harvest for wheat. Thus each chart covers
more than one year, and the time periods overlap. The delivery months
used were: corn, December and July; soybeans, November and July;
oats, July and March; and wheat, July and March. The use of only
two months makes the charts as simple as possible to read.
The first delivery month was used for computing basis until the last
day of the preceding month, when the basis computation was changed
to the distant delivery month. That is, for corn the December future
was set as zero, and the difference between the cash price and Decem-
ber was plotted until the last date shown in November. This basis is
scaled on the left side of the chart. Then July was set as zero and
above the December, set as zero, by the difference prevailing on the
day the change was made. This basis is scaled on the right side of the
chart.
For some weeks before the change from December to July was
made, July was plotted in relation to December; and for some weeks
(as long as it was traded) after the basis month was changed, Decem-
ber was plotted in relation to July. The charts for the other grains
were made in the same way except for the difference in the delivery
months.
Corn basis Fig. 6 shows the prices of corn (cash at the farm, Decem-
ber, and July futures) for each crop year, 1955 to 1961, and the average
for the period. The top half of each chart shows the actual prices; and
the bottom half, the basis as described above.
There are four observations to make about the actual prices. First,
there is a tendency for the cash farm price to go up as the season
progresses. But during this period it did not always go up, and the
amount of the increase varied greatly from year to year. The average
of the increase from the middle of October to July was 20 cents a
bushel.
Second, in the area of overlap on the charts, futures prices tend
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to be parallel, rising and falling together while the difference remains
approximately constant.
Third, in the large price movements, cash and future prices move
up and down by fairly comparable amounts, but they are not parallel
in minor fluctuations and there is a tendency for the cash to go up
more or decline less than the futures.
Fourth, the average variation in futures prices tends to be small.
The erratic individual-year variations tend to average out to zero.
This is consistent with the theory of speculative pricing that was dis-
cussed earlier. If all known factors are bid into current prices, then
the average price tends to vary only by the cost of storage, which in
futures contracts is essentially zero. Variations in futures prices result
from capricious errors in speculative discounting.
This theory, while tending to be generally true, did not work out
perfectly. The period under study was not long enough to allow the
errors to fully cancel out. But there is a discernible central tendency
for the futures price to decline about seven cents from the planting
season to harvest and to increase about five cents into the spring or
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Corn. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, December
and July futures, and basis chart, for 1955-56. (Fig. 6a)
30 Bulletin 696 [September,
summer. Is this a regular seasonal variation, or is it due to peculiarities
of the period that should not be expected to repeat regularly in the
future? This seven-year period was one of increasing per acre yield,
generally more than increases that were expected. The changes in per
acre yield from the preceding year's national average were:
1955... +2.6 1958... +4.5 1960... +1.4
1956... +5.4 1959... + .3 1961... +7.5
1957... + .9
If the market was expecting the same yield as the year before and it
became apparent, as the season progressed, that it would be larger, we
should expect a tendency for price to decline into harvest. Regular
increases in yields are discounted into price early, and we should not
expect this tendency to exist in the years ahead. The post-harvest
increase was not large enough to be ascribed to anything other than
chance.
The first point of interest in the basis charts is their similarity. In
broad outline they are all alike; no one of them deviates greatly from
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Corn. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central
and July futures, and basis chart, for 1956-57.
linois farmers, December
(Fig. 6b)
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Corn. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, December
and July futures, and basis chart, for 1957-58. (Fig. 6c)
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and July futures, and basis chart, for 1959-60. (Fig. 6e)
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Corn. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, December
and July futures, and basis chart, for 1960-61. (Fig. 6f)
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Corn. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, December
and July futures, and basis chart, for 1961-62. (Fig. 6g)
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Corn. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, December
and July futures, and basis chart, average for 1955-62. (Fig. 6h)
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the average for the period. The general outline is consistent with the
theoretical basis shown in Fig. 2. During the planting and growing
season, the basis was fairly stable and did not change in any systematic
way. The individual-year variations tended to average out to no change
(see the averages in Fig. 6g). From harvest to summer, the cash
prices increased in relation to the futures in a fairly regular pattern.
Also the spread between the December and July futures was quite
consistent from year to year. Only once (1960) did it deviate more
than one cent from the average of 11 cents.
The second major point is that there were substantial individual-
year differences. There was a range of about 10 cents in the discount
of cash from the December future during the harvest period. The
smallest basis was about 15 cents and the largest about 25 cents. The
average was 19 cents. This harvest basis was the item of greatest
year-to-year variation; sometimes it widened and sometimes it narrowed
during the harvest period. A characteristic common to all years and
not consistent with our theoretical chart is the rapid narrowing of the
basis immediately after the end of harvest. It happened every year
and is most clearly seen in the averages.
Why were there differences between the actual and the theoretical
charts and differences from year to year in the basis patterns? During
the planting and growing season, basis is a speculative matter. Mer-
chants and processors who buy grain before harvest typically hedge in
futures markets. As they buy, they are not interested in the actual
price of the grain, but in the price in relation to the future. When
they think that the cash price is lower in relation to the futures than
it will be at harvest, they buy cash and hedge in futures. Thus the
preharvest basis is equal to the expected harvest basis. Changes before
harvest are the result of speculative error in establishing the early basis.
Basis tends to be widest just at harvest and to narrow quickly after
harvest. The amount of storage space available during a particular
crop season is essentially fixed. The quantity of grain available to fill
the space is greatest at harvest and decreases gradually as the crop is
used. The basis represents the going market price for storage space.
It is a supply-demand determined price. In our theoretical basis chart,
we made basis a matter of the cost of storing grain. But space is not
always paid cost. If the demand for use of space is great in relation
to the amount available, the price (basis) may exceed cost. If, on the
other hand, the demand for the use of space is small in relation to the
amount available, the price may be less than cost. Storers will accept
less than full cost rather than let space remain empty.
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If harvest time marketings are smaller than anticipated, the basis
narrows as harvest approaches and is relatively narrow at harvest. The
fall of 1959 is a good case in point. Farmers were able to hold a high
proportion of the crop on farms and simply refused to sell liberally at
the prevailing 95 cents a bushel. The existing commercial storage
space was not in vigorous demand, and its price was less than had been
anticipated early in the season and lower than usual. It is interesting to
note that the price level of corn, as shown by the July futures, did not
go up. Holding at harvest resulted in a liberal supply later in the mar-
keting season.
An opposite pattern occurred in 1960. The preharvest basis was
relatively narrow. The crop turned out to be larger than had been
anticipated and was unusually high in moisture. The market was
glutted, the price declined, and the price of storage increased sharply
(basis widened).
The difference between the December and July futures is the price
of storage of corn at Chicago for the period from December to July.
This tends to be widest at the end of harvest or the first of December.
As we noted, there is a tendency for the storage price to be about 11
cents at the end of November. A notable exception occurred in 1960,
when the difference, or spread, was 15 cents. It was unusually wide
for the same reasons that the December basis was wide.
The end-of-season basis is of special interest. The east-central Illi-
nois farm basis during July averaged 9 cents under during the seven-
year period. Individual years were approximately as follows:
1956. . . 5 under 1959. . . 7 under 1961 ... 11 under
1957 ... 9 under 1960. . . 8 under 1962 ... 7 under
1958... 10 under
This ending basis is fairly stable. It is a function of the relative supply
of and demand for corn at Chicago and in downstate Illinois. As
stocks at Chicago are large, the basis tends to be narrow; and as stocks
at Chicago are small, the basis tends to be wide. If stocks of corn at
Chicago are quite small, it becomes necessary to pull corn to Chicago
from downstate, widening the basis to the full cost of transportation.
Soybean basis The soybean charts (Fig. 7) are similar to the corn
charts. The actual prices were erratic, showing no regular behavior. On
the average, the November soybeans showed little variation. Individual-
year variation was substantial. The average of the July futures showed
a substantial increase, amounting to about 18 cents a bushel. But if we
look at the individual years we find that the predominant trend was
downward in three years, up moderately in one year, up strongly in
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two years, and very stable one year. A long position in July soybeans
would have made money half of the time and lost money half of the
time. However, the profits would have averaged much more than the
losses.
The failure of the futures to average out to zero, as it theoretically
should, can be ascribed to two causes: First, the period was too short
for the averages to be meaningful. Such a short period should not be
used as a basis for judging long-run tendencies. Second, the market
has not yet come to appreciate the impact of a short supply of soy-
beans. It takes a large price increase to get the necessary adjustments
in use when soybean supplies are reduced moderately.
In broad outline, the basis charts are much like those for corn, but
they vary considerably in detail in individual years. The same general
forces were at work in all of the years, but these forces varied in
intensity and hence in their impact on basis patterns.
The preharvest basis tended to be about the same from year to year,
with no major variations in most years. There were sharp increases
in the discount of cash from futures at harvest in 1956 and 1957. In
1960 the basis narrowed as farmers were slow to sell at less than $2.
The market as a whole was not aware of the impending shortage, and
the futures did not move up. The slow selling by farmers reduced the
need for off-farm storage. Accordingly there was a reduction in the
going market price for storage (narowing of the basis).
There was the same tendency for a quick rise in the cash price rela-
tive to the futures immediately after harvest. This again underscores
the fact that basis is a competitive market price.
The differences between the November and July futures at the end
of October were:
1955... 5i/4 1958... 12J4 1961... lH/8
1956... 11 1960... 13^4 Average... 10^
1957... 934 1959... IH/2
Because the 1955 difference was substantially smaller than the others,
we should judge that the average of 10^ understates the real tendency.
Twelve cents is probably a more representative number.
The cash in relation to the July futures during July was:
1956... 15^ under 1959... 6 under 1962... 9 under
1957. . . 15 under 1960. . . 8 under Average. . . 9 under
1958... 6i/8 under 1961... 4 under
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1955-56. (Fig. 7a)
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1956-57. Fig. 7b
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1957-58. (Fig. 7c)
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1958-59. (Fig. 7d)
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1959-60. {Fig. 7e)
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1960-61. (Fig. 7f)
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, for 1961-62. (Fig. 7g)
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Soybeans. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, Novem-
ber and July futures, and basis chart, average for 1955-62. (Fig. 7h)
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The first two were larger than the last four. There were two rea-
sons for this difference: First, during the early part of the period,
stocks were not built up at Chicago. Accordingly, it was necessary to
attract soybeans from a considerable distance from Chicago to satisfy
local needs. Thus the country price had to discount the Chicago price
by freight to Chicago. In recent years large stocks have been regularly
accumulated at Chicago during harvest. This has tended to hold the
country price high in relation to Chicago during the latter part of the
year. Such accumulation is likely to take place in the future.
Second, during the early part of the period it was standard practice
to trade No. 2 yellow soybeans as the standard grade, but in recent
years the trading has been based on No. 1 yellow. The Chicago futures
contract was for No. 2 yellow. The result of this change was to increase
the country price relative to Chicago. When the Chicago futures con-
tract is changed to a No. 1, this gain will be lost.
On balance we are disposed to regard 7 cents as a representa-
tive discount of the country price under the July futures during July.
One further point of interest in the soybean charts is the erratic
postharvest basis pattern in 1960 to 1961. The basis behaved until
January, when it widened. It widened again in April and in June. The
first big, rapid rise in the soybean price came in January. The country
price failed to follow the futures up. Farmers did not believe that soy-
bean prices would go up so much and therefore sold large quantities.
Processors did not believe it either and failed to follow the futures up
with their bids. The April basis reaction occurred during the final
upsurge of soybean prices. The reasons were similar. The basis
widening during June was part of the downward race in price. Under
the rules of the exchange, future prices can fall only 10 cents a day.
There is no limit on the possible decline in cash prices.
The appropriate conclusion is that basis tends to be erratic in years
when price changes are large and rapid but finally follows its usual
pattern.
Oafs basis The prices of oats were erratic. The variations in futures
in individual years tended to average out to zero. The only discernible
repetitive pattern was a decline from January to March.
The basis patterns were similar in broad outline in each of the
years; yet there were significant year-to-year differences. The first
outstanding point was the tendency for the basis to narrow moderately
from January to harvest. The seven years from 1955 to 1962 were a
period of generally declining oat production. Usually oat plantings and
42 Bulletin 696 [September,
$0.70 - MARCH
.40 h
li ii ill i ill nli uli i ii 1 1 i ilin In nil i ih ii i li ill i nl mil in 1 1
1
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR
3 77426 51 63753 65
|mi
1 1 1 ii 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 i|i i ii 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 j
|
mi i j 1 1 1 1 ii i i|i rrp I 1 1 | I II | II I 1 1 I
MARCH
X
o
0§
2
-10
•2°g
Oafs. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, July and
March futures, and basis chart, for 1955-56. (Fig. 8a)
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Oafs. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, July and
March futures, and basis chart, for 1957-58. (Fig. 8c)
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March futures, and basis chart, for 1958-59. (Fig. 8d)
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Oafs. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, July and
March futures, and basis chart, for 1959-60. (Fig. 8e)
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Oafs. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, July and
March futures, and basis chart, for 1960-61. (Fig. 8f)
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Oafs. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, July and
March futures, and basis chart, for 1961-62. (Fig. 8g)
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Oats. Weekly cash prices bid to east-central Illinois farmers, November
and July futures, and basis chart, average for 1955-62. (Fig. 8h)
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production turned out to be smaller each year than in the preceding
year. This accounts for the tendency to consistently overestimate the
basis that would prevail during harvest.
There was a sharp basis gain immediately after harvest, but it was
usually followed by a widening of the basis. Careful examination also
shows a tendency for the price to decline at the same time. This latter
tendency is not consistent with theoretical basis behavior. The most
reasonable explanation lies in the competition between oats and soy-
beans for storage space on farms. It appears that oats were put away
during harvest and moved to market a short time later to make room
for soybeans. This put pressure on cash prices and tended to widen
the basis.
The differences between July and March futures at the end of June
were as follows:
1955... 4 1958... 6 1961...
1956... 6y& 1959... 5^ Average... 5i/2
1957... 5i/8 1960... 5i/2
The consistency of these spreads gives us considerable confidence in
applying them to future years as a basis for market actions.
The maximum basis gain was usually experienced by the first of
the year following harvest. In every year there was a tendency for the
basis to widen after January. This widening was consistent with the
tendency for the price of oats to decline during the spring. These two
things tell us that there was a negative market price for storing oats at
country points from January on. This is not unreasonable. Oats are
used almost entirely for feed. Farmers hold amounts that they antici-
pate will be needed for feed and seed plus a reserve. It is the move-
ment of this reserve to market that puts pressure on the cash price and
the basis. Holding a reserve is equivalent to accepting a negative return
for storage. Farmers are willing to pay a small amount to be sure that
they have enough. This is not a conscious decision. It is interesting to
note how thorough the market is in putting a price on things.
The fact that the narrowest basis occurs in early January makes
this the pertinent time to measure basis rather than at the end of the
storage season, as we did for corn and soybeans. It does not pay to
hold oats past January except for reasons other than price. On the first
day of January for which data were collected, the bases were:
1956... 61/2 under 1959... 81/2 under 1962... 8^ under
1957... 4^4 under 1960... 4i/& under Average... 61/2 under
1958... launder 1961... 9i/4 under
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This range is substantial. Accordingly, the average should be used with
reservation.
Wheat basis The price of wheat does not show any regular seasonal
pattern. The average for the seven years shows a seasonal increase.
The first reason is the familiar one that the period is too short for the
averaging principle to work effectively.
There is also a second reason. The price of wheat was regularly
dominated by government price programs. The wheat program worked.
The result tended to be a built-in seasonal increase. It was always
clear that the rise in the price of wheat would be limited by government
resale at a price moderately above the loan. With the knowledge that
the price would never go appreciably above the loan, the ownership of
wheat held no attraction except as the price went below the loan
equivalent for futures and below the loan minus storage charges for
cash wheat. Once the price got below the loan, buying and holding
was encouraged. As a sufficient amount moved into the loan, the price
was forced up to a level enough above the loan to enable farmers to
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redeem and sell wheat. This below- to above-the-loan tendency forced
a somewhat regular seasonal variation.
Basis patterns were more erratic for wheat than for the other
grains. The reason was that wheat is less closely related to Chicago
than are the others. Wheat is grown in the southern half of the state
and is thus a greater physical distance from Chicago.
There are three principal outlets for Illinois wheat: several mills in
Illinois, St. Louis, and New Orleans. Chicago is a minor destination.
About the only time wheat moves to Chicago is when it overflows exist-
ing storage space outside of Chicago or Chicago supplies are not large
enough for local milling needs in the spring.
There are other reasons why Chicago and downstate Illinois prices
are relatively independent, but it is sufficient for our purposes to point
out that they are fairly independent of each other.
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In spite of the independence of the two prices, the basis pattern was
broadly the one we have now become accustomed to. It was fairly
stable before harvest, narrowed sharply immediately after harvest, and
then usually narrowed for the rest of the season.
The July-March spreads at the end of June were as follows:
1955... 2yk 1958... 11J4 1961... 15#
1956... 77/s 1959... 12i/2 Average... 10
1957... 8H 1960... 12y4
In the more recent years in the series the basis has tended to be wide
because relatively large stocks were built up at Chicago. The July-
March spread is the price of storage for wheat for the period of the
spread. It tends to be wide as stocks are large and narrow as stocks are
small. Again it should be noted that this spread is the market price of
storage at Chicago. It is reasonable to expect that stocks will be large
at Chicago in the future, and so 10 cents should be used as a "normal"
spread.
The month and amount of the narrowest basis during each year
were as follows:
Year Month Basis Year Month Basis
1955-56.
. Jan. .
.
9 1/£ under 1959-60. . Feb. . Even
1956-57.
. Dec. 13 under 1960-61
.
. Oct. .
.
S}/2 under
1957-58.
. Jan. . 12i/2 under 1961-62. . Mar.. . 6]4 under
1958-59.
. Feb.. 12 under Average. . Jan.
.
12^4 under
From these amounts we should conclude that holding wheat past Janu-
ary is generally somewhat pointless and that about 12 cents under is a
reasonable basis expectation.
Basis conclusions This cursory examination of basis behavior leads
to several conclusions: (1) Basis patterns are broadly similar from
one year to the next. (2) There are substantial year-to-year variations
in basis patterns. (3) The different grains have different amounts of
basis regularity, the basis for corn and soybeans being more regular
than that for oats and wheat. (4) One of the principal factors causing
year-to-year variation in basis is the supply of and demand for storage.
(5) A second major factor affecting basis is the relative supply of and
demand for grain in Chicago and at outside points. (6) Basis is a
rational market price that responds to economic forces. It is therefore
subject to individual-year analysis. That is, basis variations from
averages are forecastable by careful students of basis.
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FARMER USE OF FUTURES
Use in connection with a farm business There is a difference be-
tween using futures markets in connection with a farm business and
speculating in commodity futures. The use of futures markets in con-
nection with a farm business is speculative only in a limited sense.
Futures can be used in an attempt to increase the total price of cash
grain or to decrease the cost of feeding operations. In either case the
key questions to be answered are: "Is this the appropriate time to
buy?" or "Is this the appropriate time to sell?"
The answers to these questions are speculative. Success or failure
depends on making the right forecast about subsequent price behavior.
This is not an unusual experience for farmers. Selecting the time to
buy and sell is one of the most important marketing problems of farm-
ers. It is part of their usual grain speculation. Futures markets can be
used as an adjunct to the usual grain speculation of farmers. Futures
trading is a device by which farmers can price grain ahead— to either
sell ahead or buy ahead. Accordingly the first rule is that the size of the
futures position must be the same (as nearly as possible, because of
the size of the unit of futures contracts) as the size of the cash grain
position involved.
Farmers may speculate in futures markets aside from their farming
businesses. This is an ancient and honorable activity, but it is not re-
lated to the farm business. When farmers speculate in futures markets,
they are no different from physicians, lawyers, and the like. This
activity is outside the scope of the present discussion.
A futures market position must be either long or short. It must be
opposite to the position existing in the cash grain on which the farmer
is establishing a price. If it is the same as the existing cash position,
the farmer is simply taking on a speculation in addition to the cash-
grain speculation that already exists.
Farmers can use futures markets in four ways: (1) to fix the
price of a growing or not-yet-planted crop; (2) to fix the price of grain
in storage for deferred delivery; (3) to fix the cost of feed without
taking immediate delivery; and (4) to speculate in the price of a crop
that has been grown but for which storage is not available. The first
two involve being short futures and the second two being long futures.
To fix the price of a crop before harvest By selling futures before
planting or during the growing season, farmers can assure themselves,
within fairly narrow limits, of the net price they will receive at harvest.
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The essential thing that a farmer must be able to do is to look at exist-
ing futures quotations and determine what they mean in terms of a net
price at his local elevator at harvest. This is a matter of understanding
basis.
Table 3 shows the result of a planting time (January for wheat)
sale of futures followed by a harvest sale of cash and purchase of
futures. For corn, May 2 was selected as the planting date, and the
price of December futures on that date was noted. From the basis
studies, 18 cents under the December futures was selected as the most
likely cash to futures price relationship prevailing at harvest. The 18
cents was subtracted from the December futures price to obtain a
"target price." What does this mean? It means that if a farmer sold
December futures sometime before harvest he would get a net price
(the cash price received at the local elevator plus or minus the profits
or losses on the December futures) of approximately the target price.
Let us follow the system through the 1955 experience for corn: On
May 2 the December futures price was $1.37%. Subtracting 18 cents
gives a target price of $1.19%. The market as a whole is saying that
it thinks the price of December futures will be $1.37%. As we have
seen, that probably will not be the case. The market is also saying that,
come what may, it will assure the farmer that he will get approximately
$1.19%. The farmer decides that he is willing to accept this amount
for harvest delivery. He therefore sells December futures in an
amount equal to the amount that he expects to produce and deliver.
Suppose that he expects to produce 10,000 bushels; he sells 10,000
bushels of December futures. On October 17 he harvests, delivers, and
sells cash corn to his local elevator and receives the then current market
price of $1.06 for it. At the same time he buys December futures, off-
setting the original contract and closing out his futures position. The
December futures price on October 17, 1955, was $1.27%. He sold at
$1.37% and bought at $1.27%. He therefore has a profit of 10 cents a
bushel, or $1,000. He adds this 10-cent profit to the $1.06 that he
received from the elevator, for a net price of $1.16. To complete the
transaction we should subtract a commission of approximately i/£ cent
a bushel on the futures transaction.
It should be especially noted that these two transactions are sepa-
rate. The farmer sells his cash corn at the local elevator. He makes
the futures transaction with a commission futures merchant. The only
places that the two get together are in the farmer's system of figuring
how much he got for his corn and, more importantly, in his bank
account. The farmer is operating two separate but parallel transactions.
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The net price received in 1955 was 3% under the target price.
Why? Because the basis was wider than the 18-cent "normal" harvest
basis. The basis chart (Figure 6a) shows a sharp break at just the
time he harvested and sold. Had he sold cash (and bought December
futures) one week sooner, he would have been precisely on target.
As we look across the bottom line of the corn section of Table 3,
we see by how much the target was missed. The net price was under
the target price three times and over it four times. The range was 4^4
under to 4]/s over. This was the extent of the uncertainty in the net
price to be received by selling December futures. The size of the
misses would have been reduced if we had injected some flexibility into
the date of sale of corn and purchase of the December futures. We
arbitrarily selected October 17. Had we allowed this date to vary,
attempting to close the transactions when the basis was 18 cents, we
would have been closer.
Was this a good idea? Obviously yes. In 1955 the farmer received
10 cents more than he would have if he had not used the futures
market as an aid in selling forward. As we look across the profit-and-
loss line of the corn section, we note that it was advantageous to sell
ahead in all of the seven years. But this should not be taken as a gen-
eral rule. In discussing the seasonal pattern of December futures
prices, we noted reasons why it had occurred and why we should not
expect it to recur regularly. In the long run the increases and decreases
in futures prices will tend to average out to zero. Thus the profits and
losses will tend to average out to zero if the same things are done each
year in routine fashion.
The most important point to note in Table 3 is the extent of the
misses of the target. They are a measure of how accurately grain can
be priced ahead for harvest delivery. The use of futures to sell ahead
of harvest is not a device for increasing the price of grain each year.
Rather, it is a device by which farmers can accept a price that is offered
when in their judgment it makes a good sale. The futures market is
not saying what the price will be at harvest. It is simply offering an
approximate price now. Whether or not a farmer accepts is a specu-
lative decision that he must make. The important point is that farmers
need to be able to look at the futures market and figure out what the
quotation means in terms of the net price at their local elevator at
harvest. They then have a rational basis for deciding whether or not
to sell ahead.
In most localities elevators will bid for harvest delivery before
planting and throughout the growing season. Thus the farmer has a
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choice: he can contract ahead at a firm price with the elevator for cash
grain, or he can sell futures. Contracting ahead has three advantages:
the exact price is known, the quantity is divisible by less than units of
1,000 bushels, and it is not necessary to maintain a margin deposit as
in the case of futures.
Using futures to sell ahead has two advantages: First, the average
forward price is higher. As farmers sell ahead of planting or during
the growing season, someone is selling futures. Perhaps the elevator
is selling futures against its purchases from farmers, or it may be that
the elevator makes a cash forward contract with an interior merchant
or processor who, in turn, sells futures. Whoever is doing it is bidding
enough less for the cash grain to cover the cost, including the risk due
to variable results that we have labeled "miss of target," and leave a
profit.
The second advantage is that use of futures provides greater flexi-
bility— greater ease for the farmer to change his mind. Suppose that
at planting time a farmer notes that the December corn futures indi-
cates a net price for harvest delivery that he thinks will make a good
sale and so he sells. During July the weather gets hot and dry and it
begins to look as if the crop will be short. The price starts up. What
looked like a good sale early now looks like an error. Our friend can
reverse his sale just as quickly as he can call his broker and buy an
offsetting December contract. All it will cost him to again be long his
growing crop is the amount that the price has gone up while he was
becoming alert to the developing situation.
Or suppose that a farmer sells at planting time and during June
and July the price goes down 12 cents as the result of favorable grow-
ing conditions. He now figures the indicated net price and decides
that he would rather be long cash than long cash and short futures. He
can offset his futures contract. He should put the profits on the futures
contract away to add to the price received for the cash grain at harvest.
In the case of corn and soybeans, the estimates of basis we have
used may overstate the cash to futures discounts that will prevail in
the future. During the first three of the seven years, the net price of
corn was under the target, and in the last four it was over. These last
four years may be more representative of the future than the whole
period is. Perhaps a harvest basis of 12 to 14 cents will be more accu-
rate in the future. The soybean misses have a somewhat similar, though
less pronounced, tendency. Twelve cents may be a more appropriate
discount in the future. Oat prices fell most nearly on target of the four
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grains. The largest miss was 1% cents. Net prices of wheat miss the
target badly. As noted in the basis discussion, wheat prices are not
closely tied to Chicago. The 17-cent discount of cash to futures is
fairly close to the cost of delivering wheat to Chicago from the northern
part of the Illinois wheat production area. It should therefore be
regarded as nearly a maximum discount rather than an average or
normal discount. The target price tends to be a minimum rather than
an accurate target.
To fix the price of grain in storage for later delivery Table 4 is
an exercise in forward pricing of grain that is in storage. The pro-
cedure is the same as pricing forward for harvest delivery at planting
time. Target prices were established for each grain by subtracting a
"normal" basis from a futures price near the end of the storage season.
This target price is the approximate net price that the market was
bidding for late-season delivery. That is, on October 17, 1955, the
market was saying to east-central Illinois farmers. "We will pay you
approximately $1.28i/2 per bushel for corn to be delivered about July
1, 1956." The procedure was for the farmer to sell July futures in an
amount equal to the amount of corn he had in storage and about the
following (1956) July 1 to buy July futures, sell cash corn at his local
elevator, and subtract the loss on the futures contract from the price
received for his cash corn.
The "miss of target" figures measure the accuracy of the indicated
forward price. They are by no means precise. Yet they fall within
fairly narrow limits. They were much less variable than the level of
prices of the grains. The essential point is that regardless of what
happened to the level of prices the market came fairly close to perform-
ing on its net price commitment. For example, on October 3, 1959, the
target price for soybeans was $2.17i/6. By June 25, 1960, the price
level (July futures) of soybeans had declined 13 cents. Yet the market
missed performance by only y& cent. The following year the price level
increased 37 cents. The market missed the forward price by only ^
cent. The dates for closing the transactions were always the same,
leaving no room for judgment. Had these been less rigid the size of
the misses would have been reduced.
Again, the decision about whether to accept the forward price is a
speculative one. The opportunity to forward price is always present.
Whether it should be accepted or not depends upon whether the person
holding the grain thinks that the level of price, as measured by the
distant futures, is going to go up or not. If the futures prices do subse-
quently go up, he will regret having priced forward. If they go down,
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he will profit by selling. The figures for "profit or loss" in Table 4
indicate whether it turned out to be a good idea to price forward or
simply to hold cash grain for later sale.
Between them, Tables 3 and 4 show 56 transactions in futures.
There were 32 profits, 23 losses, and one break-even, meaning that the
price went down 32 times, up 23, and did not change once. The average
size of the profits was 7% cents, and the average of the losses was 9^.
cents. On average it was more profitable to be short than long, but
this is not a meaningful average. It is too near even to be ascribed to
anything other than chance.
In contemplating the question of a forward sale, a farmer must look
at the price of the distant future, calculate what it means in terms of
the price at his local elevator during the month of maturity of the
futures contract, and then decide whether or not he wants to be long
at that price. Let us review such a decision: On October 3, 1961, the
cash price of soybeans was $2.25 and the July futures price was
$2.5314. Assuming a normal basis of 7 cents, the forward price was
$2.46|4- The government support price was $2.42, including all pos-
sible moisture and quality premiums. The crop was obviously larger
than would be used up. The policy of the government was to sell any
soybeans that it took over at a price equivalent to $2.47^4 to farmers.
The question that the farmer should have asked himself was: "Do I
want to be long soybeans that are now priced at $2.4614 for delivery
next July 1 ?"— not "Do I want to be long soybeans at $2.25 ?" The
problem was to ask the right question.
Table 4 includes a section on storage for each of the grains. It
shows the harvest price, the net price realized by forward pricing
through the use of futures contract sales, and the returns to storage.
The return to storage is the amount of increase in the cash price in
relation to the futures price. These same values can be seen visually
in the basis charts that we reviewed earlier.
We noted from our charts that the prices of cash grains tend to go
up seasonally. These increases are the net values of two kinds of
change: payment for storage and price level. In the long run the
change in the price level averages out to zero, and only the payment for
storage remains. The size of the payments for storage vary substan-
tially from year to year. The price of storage is a competitive market
price that depends on the supply of and demand for storage space.
The importance of the concept of storage is that farmers can profit-
ably continue to use storage space even though they think that the price
will decline. Suppose that at harvest or shortly after a farmer looks
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at the existing price and decides that this is a good time to sell— that
the price is more likely to go down than up. If he does sell, his existing
storage space will remain empty, with no return until the next harvest.
If he does not use futures, he must be long to obtain a return from the
use of storage. If he does use futures to price ahead, he can get a
storage return without being vulnerable to a price decline; that is, he
can have his cake and eat it too.
The use of futures to price stored grain ahead offers farmers an
opportunity to change their minds that is not possible when they sell
cash grain. The sale and delivery of cash grain is quite final. Once a
farmer sells and delivers, he is out of the game. If he is pricing for-
ward via futures, he can get back in at any time that, in his judgment,
he should. Two examples illustrate this point: During the 1960 harvest
a selling price of $2.00 for soybeans appeared to be reasonable to many
people. The crop was large, and demand did not appear vigorous.
During October and November several bullish things happened. Each
successive estimate of the size of the crop was smaller. Export demand
for soybeans was vigorous. The government became quite active in
exporting surplus oil. In early December news of a Chinese drought
meant that China would not compete with U. S. soybean exports. That
did it ! A $2.00 sale no longer looked good. If a farmer had sold at
$2.00, he was through. Had he sold July futures on October 3 at
$2.2414, he could have bought them back and been long the stored
crop. He could have done so as late as December 19, at as low as $2.24.
For a second example we will take corn in the fall of 1961. As we
have seen, the target price was $1.14^ on October 17. This price
looked good because of the prospect of large government sales. By the
end of February the July futures had declined to $1.12. Disregarding
futures profits already accrued, the target price was then $1.04. In
view of the large amount of corn moving into the support structure,
this did not look like a good sale. It was a price at which most farmers
preferred to be long. Farmers who had sold July futures against stored
corn on October 17 could take a 10-cent profit and again be long
stored corn.
In Tables 3 and 4 we adhered rigidly to pricing forward at planting
and harvest. The opportunity offered farmers is by no means so rigid.
By use of futures, farmers can decide to fix or unfix the price for
forward delivery at any time that their speculative judgment tells them
to do so.
Table 5 combines the operations shown in Tables 3 and 4 and intro-
duces flexibility in the timing of operations. It illustrates a system of
1963] Grain Futures Markets in Farm Business 63
pricing forward at planting time for delivery after the crop has been
produced and stored for six to nine months.
The procedure for corn was ( 1 ) to sell December futures at plant-
ing time; (2) to buy December and sell July, after trading starts for
delivery the following July (about August 1), whenever a premium of
10 cents for the July can be obtained or on November 14, whichever
occurs first; and (3) to sell cash and buy July futures when the cash
price is within 8 cents of the July futures price, but not later than
July 3. The dates of execution of the switch from December to July
and the closing of the transactions are shown in the table. The normal
spread of 10 cents was established by examining the data in Appendix
Table 1. The target prices were a net of 2 cents over the December
futures (plus 10 minus 8) for delivery upwards of 14 months forward.
For soybeans the procedure was (1) to sell November futures at
planting time; (2) to switch to July at a 12-cent premium, but not later
than October 31; and (3) to close the transaction on a 7-cent basis,
but not later than July 2. The target prices were a net of 5 cents
over the November futures (plus 12 minus 7).
For oats the procedure was to (1) sell July futures at planting time;
(2) switch to March at a 5-cent premium, but not later than June
27; and (3) close out the transaction at a basis of 5i/£ cents, but not
later than January 3. The reasons for closing out so early were dis-
cussed in the section on basis behavior. Target prices were a net of J/2
cent under the July future.
For wheat the procedure was to (1) sell July futures on January
10; (2) switch to the subsequent March contract at a premium of 10
cents, but not later than July 5; and (3) close out the transaction at a
basis of 12 under, but not later than January 30.
The target prices were not always precisely realized. They some-
times fell short because spreads did not get as wide as the target
spreads and because the basis did not always get as narrow as the target
basis. They were sometimes exceeded because the actual spreads were
wider than the target spreads when trading in the subsequent futures
started or because overnight basis changes were rapid. Target prices
would have been slightly more accurately realized if daily instead of
weekly prices had been used.
For corn, soybeans, and oats, the misses of the target prices were
small. Wheat basis and spreads are less regular; hence the misses of
target tend to be larger.
It should again be emphasized that the profits and losses from the
futures transactions tend to average out to zero. The use of futures in
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a routine way, such as is illustrated in Table 5, does not in the long
run add to or subtract from the realized price of grain. Futures mar-
kets are a tool for pricing forward when a farmer's best speculative
judgment tells him it is time to fix the price of grain.
To fix the cost of feed without taking immediate delivery Live-
stock feeders are subject to several kinds of uncertainty. In addition to
production uncertainties, there are market uncertainties with regard to
the selling price of the livestock and the cost of feed. Futures markets
can have usefulness in fixing the cost of feed.
As a livestock feeder starts a feeding program, he commits him-
self to the use of feed. The feed that he does not have on hand he must
subsequently buy. He is short a requirement of feed. If at the outset
of the program he buys a sufficient amount of feed to last the entire
feeding season, he can nail down one more cost item and thus reduce
his total uncertainty. The feeding season is usually regarded as from
fall to fall. Thus we are talking about buying feed in the fall of the
year. In the main we are talking about buying corn.
Producers who do not have a sufficient amount of storage space or
who do not wish to tie up their money in corn inventory can fix the cost
of corn by buying futures. They are short cash corn for feeding re-
quirements. They therefore buy corn futures in an amount equal to
their actual feed requirements. As space is available and they acquire
cash corn, they sell the corn futures. Profits made on the futures trans-
actions are subtracted from the price paid for the cash corn to get the
net cost of feed. Similarly, losses taken on the futures transaction are
added to the price of the cash corn to get the net cost of feed.
If cash and futures prices moved up and down precisely together,
the price of the feed corn could be fixed at the price existing when the
futures transaction was initiated. To illustrate let us suppose that a
feeder observes that the price of cash corn at his local elevator is
95 cents. He likes this price and wishes to fix it for the supplemental
feed corn that he will eventually buy. He buys futures at, say, $1.10,
or 15 cents over the cash. Some months later when he needs the cash
corn he pays $1.05. If the cash and futures prices have moved up the
same amount, he will sell his futures contract for $1.20, realizing a 10-
cent profit. He subtracts this cost from the $1.05 that he paid for cash
corn, for a net cost (ignoring futures commission charges) of 95 cents.
However, as we have seen, cash and futures do not move up and
down together. The cash gains in relation to the futures. Increases in
the futures will not offset the increase in the cash price. This increase
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Table 6.— Purchases of Futures to Fix the Cost of Feed Corn,
1955-61 Crops
Crop year
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
November 14.
.
April 2
. Buy July futures
. Sell July futures
135J4
147%
148^
133%
127%
122%
120
123%
120%
121%
115%
112%
120%
119%
April 2
Profit or loss
. Buy cash corn8
+ 12
129
-15%
116
-5
113
+3%
112%
+ 1
111
-3H
95%
-%
106%
Net cost of feed corn 117 131M 118 108% no 98% 107%
November 14.
.
. Cash price 105 123 100 99 101 85 100
Payment for storage
April 2 basis
12
1SH
8%
17%
18
9%
9%
11%
9
10%
13%
16%
7%
13
a Farmers' selling price at local elevator.
in cash in relation to the futures is equal to the going market price for
storage. In effect, the feeder pays someone to store the corn that he
has bought until he needs it. And because someone is storing the
corn for him he should reasonably be expected to pay for this service.
In Table 6 we have set up an exercise in fixing corn prices by buy-
ing July futures. We assumed that the farmer needed to purchase
about one-half year's supply of corn and that space would be available
on the farm by April 1. Mid-November was selected as the most favor-
able time to initiate the transaction. The results were computed for the
seven years 1955 to 1961.
In each of the seven years the net cost of the feed corn was higher
than the harvest price; that is, the cash always gained in relation to the
futures. The amount of this gain is shown on the line "payment for
storage." It averaged 11 14 cents during the period. The experience
here was that 4^ months' storage cost an average of 11 14 cents, which
is a high monthly rate. It probably overstates the long-term rate be-
cause of the very large basis gain in 1957 to 1958.
In those years in which there was a profit in futures, the net cost of
feed corn was reduced; and in those years in which there was a loss,
the net cost of feed corn was increased. There were losses in four
years and profits in three. The average size of the losses was greater
than that of the profits. This does not prove that farmers should not
price feed corn ahead by buying futures. The period is too short to
provide a reliable average. In the long run, profits and losses should
be equal if the same transactions are made at the same time each year.
There are benefits from pricing feed corn ahead even though in the
long run it only breaks even. It is a method by which the approximate
cost of feed can be established. The knowledge of cost is useful in
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planning feeding operations. Pricing feed corn ahead reduces the total
risk involved in feeding operations.
It is clear that the purchase of corn futures does not assure that the
cost of corn will be the current price. It will be higher than the current
price by the amount of basis gain. The problem, then, is to understand
what the current futures prices mean in terms of the ultimate net cost
of corn. The feeder should subtract the basis that he expects to exist at
the time he wishes to buy and take delivery of cash corn from the cur-
rent corn futures price. If he wishes to buy and take delivery of cash
corn on April 2 and expects a basis of 13 under the July at that time,
and the current price of July futures is $1.25, he should reckon his net
cost at $1.12 ($1.25 minus 13). This becomes his target price. The bot-
tom line in Table 6 shows the basis (cash at local elevators to July
futures) on April 2 of each of the seven years. The average was 13^4
cents, and there was a substantial variation in this average. The amount
that the April 2 basis varies is the amount of uncertainty that exists
about the net cost of feed corn.
What should a farmer do? He should reckon his approximate net
cost and then decide whether he wishes to fix that price or wait until a
later time to buy.
To speculate in the price of a crop that has been produced but
for which storage is not available Farmers sometimes wish to delay
the pricing of grain past the time they can hold cash grain on farms.
They can do so by selling cash grain and replacing it with an equal
amount of grain futures. This is speculation. They are long. If the
price goes up, they will make money. If it goes down, they will lose
money. Such speculation is an integral part of an ordinary farm busi-
ness. Speculation in futures is neither more nor less a part of the farm
business than maintaining a long position in cash grain so long as it re-
places a cash-grain speculation that formerly existed.
Farmers often ask if they can sell cash grain at harvest and replace
it with futures to take advantage of the seasonal rise in prices without
incurring the costs of storage. This cannot be done. As we have seen,
there is no regular seasonal pattern in grain futures prices, and cash
prices increase in relation to futures prices so that whoever is long
futures dees, in effect, pay storage.
Table 7 shows the results of working out a repetitive system of
replacing cash grain with futures at harvest and selling late in the
season. The ending dates for corn and soybeans were placed just be-
fore the beginning of the delivery month. Ending dates for oats and
wheat were placed in January because of the tendency noted earlier to
top out seasonally at that time.
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Whether the net price was increased or decreased can be quickly
seen from the line "profit and loss" for each grain. It should be noted
that the futures transactions are precisely opposite to those shown in
Table 4 where grains were priced for deferred delivery. It was pretty
much of a stand-off for corn. The price went down in four of the
seven years. The average size of the decreases was larger than that of
the increases.
The cash price the farmer would have received if he had held cash
corn in store to June 25 is shown. The net price he actually received
was subtracted from this cash price. The difference is the amount that
he paid, in effect, for storage. These were substantial amounts, gen-
erally more than covering the full cost of on-farm storage. It should be
noted that these are the same amounts shown in Table 4.
But this is not all of the loss that should be met in storing corn.
The prices shown are for No. 2 yellow. The corn delivered at harvest
was subject to moisture discounts. Part of the discount exists because
the market does not pay for water, but part of it is an actual discount
to cover the cost of drying corn down to storable moisture. 1
Two things are clear: (1) it pays to hold corn past harvest when
space is available, either as a long cash position or priced forward via
a sale of futures, and (2) it does not pay to routinely replace cash with
futures. When storage space is not available, it sometimes pays to
replace cash with futures. Selecting the years to do so is a matter of
speculating in the price of corn. And farmers are fairly skilled at this.
The problem is to figure out the cash farm price at which the farmer is
actually going long when he buys the July future. In the fall of 1959,
with the cash price at 94 cents and the government loan available to all
producers at $1.06, corn seemed a cinch to go up. It did go up 14
cents a bushel, but July futures went down \y% cents. The cash price
increased 15^ cents in relation to the July futures price. Thus the
buyer of July contracts actually went long cash at $1.09^. Knowing
this, few farmers would have replaced cash with futures.
How does a farmer know at what price he is going long? The
answer is a matter of anticipating basis. The June 25 basis is shown
in Table 7. We earlier established a "normal" basis for June 25 of
8 cents under the July. Thus on October 17, 1959, the farmer should
have said to himself, "If I subtract 8 cents from $1,171/$, I find that I
am going long cash corn as of next summer at a cash price of $1.09^4.
The cash price must go up to $1,091/2 before I make any profit. Do I
think the price is going higher than $1,091/2 ?"
1 For a full discussion of discounts, see 111. Agr. Ext. Cir. 833.
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The same conclusions are apparent with regard to soybeans, oats,
and wheat. In the long run the replacement of cash with futures is a
break-even proposition. To successfully use futures markets in this
way requires a better-than-average job of speculation. A rather large
payment for storage must, in effect, be made when cash is replaced by
futures. While variable, ending basis can be effectively used to deter-
mine the cash-grain price represented by the futures price.
The data for Table 7 are included in Appendix Tables 1 to 4 and
are shown visually in the price and basis charts.
SOME COMMON PITFALLS IN FUTURES TRADING
There are several ways in which farmers (and others) can go
wrong in their futures trading operations. In all futures trading there
is uncertainty about the outcome because of variability in basis. This is
to be expected, and a trade that fails to materialize as expected because
of an unusual basis behavior should not be scored as an error.
The first type of error is improper calculation of basis— the failure
to add the right normal basis to or subtract it from the right future.
The exercises performed in the various tables should be repeated, using
slightly different dates. Proposed transactions should be tested on
previous years.
The second type of error is to fail to relate the futures transactions
to the farm business in the size and direction of position. The futures
position must be as nearly as possible the same size as the cash position.
Margin requirements for trades in grain futures are small. Farmers
are tempted to take larger futures positions than the cash positions
being offset without realizing the large losses and gains that can result
from small price changes. The temptation is particularly great to re-
place cash sales with larger quantities of futures. The reasoning is that
if it is desirable to replace 5,000 bushels of cash corn with 5,000 of
futures, then it is even better to replace it with 25,000. To do so is to
leave the farm business and become a speculator.
Positions in futures must be opposite cash position. If the farmer is
trying to establish a price for deferred delivery of a growing or stored
crop, he is long cash and therefore must be short futures. If he is long
futures, he is increasing his risk and trading in futures in a way that is
not related to the farm business. If he has need for additional feed
supplies, he is short cash and should therefore be long futures.
The third type of error is the failure to close out both the cash and
the futures transaction simultaneously. Most people are reluctant to
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take a loss on futures. Suppose that a farmer is long the crop that he
has in storage and short futures against it and the level of price goes
up. He has made money on the cash and lost on the futures. The net
of the change may be meeting his target price exactly, but when he
sells cash he is tempted to stay short the futures in the hope that it will
go back down so that he can retain his cash profits without having to
offset part of them with futures losses. He is reluctant to admit that he
made a mistake when he priced his cash grain forward instead of stay-
ing long. He must learn to live with his decisions in the same way that
he does if he sells the actual cash grain too soon. When he prices a
growing or stored crop forward by selling futures, he is working with
basis and is no longer concerned with changes in the level of price.
The fourth type of error is to trade in and out. We have described
some situations in which farmers can wisely reverse positions taken in
futures as they change their minds about the future course of prices.
There is always the temptation to overdo this reversal. Suppose that
a farmer prices a growing crop forward by selling futures. The price
goes down and even though he thinks it will finally go lower, he expects
some short-term recovery. He is tempted to take a quick profit,
expecting to sell again when the price recovers. If he does so, he is be-
coming a short-term trader, something that most farmers are not
qualified to do. One of the most difficult aspects of futures trading is
to resist taking a quick profit.
From the several types of errors it is clear that farmers should
develop a careful plan and stick with it except as they have a very good
reason to change, and further that they should ration themselves to
one change of mind.
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Appendix Table 1.— Corn: Weekly Prices, Cash Bid to Farmers at Local Elevators
in East-Central Illinois, December and July Futures, Basis, and December-
July Spreads, 1955-61 Crop Years
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Dec. July Basis Differ-
ence
Date
1955
April 4 122
11...,
18...
25...
May 2 . .
.
9...
16...
23...
31...
June 6...
13...
20...
27...
July 5...
11...
18...
25...
1...Aug
15.
29.
120
122
122
121
123
123
122
119%
117
117%
116%
117
117%
115%
111
108%
110
107
104%
107
107%
Sept. 6 108>
Oct.
12.
19.
26.
3.
10.
17.
24.
31.
Nov. 7.
14.
21.
28.
Dec. 5
.
12.
19.
27.
1956
Jan. 3
.
9.
16.
23.
30.
,Feb. 6.
108%
111%
117
113%
113
106
100%
106
108%
105
103%
107%
115%
116%
114
114
114
114
113%
114
114
115%
13 116%
20.
27.
118
118
12.
19.
26.
Mar. 5 118%
119
122
126
April 2 129
9 134
16 135
23 142
30 141%
May 7 143%
14 142
21 140%
28 139
June 4 142%
11 144%
18
25.
July 2
.
9.
16.
143^
144%
144
144%
146
1955 Crop
138%
136%
138%
138%
137 %
140 %
138%
138%
135%
133%
134
133%
133%
134H
133%
129%
127%
129%
126%
124%
128%
128%
128%
128
130%
136%
131%
131
127%
125
128%
129%
124%
125%
125
127
127
124%
134%
135%
135%
139
145
140%
139%
136%
134%
138%
139%
135%
136%
136
136%
137%
135%
134%
134%
136%
136%
137%
137
138%
137%
138%
137%
137%,
138%
141%
144%
147%
149%
150%
155%
154%
156%
154%
151
147%
149%
152%
149%
149%
148%
149
151%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%
15%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%
17
17%
18%
19
19%
19%
19%
21%
20%
20
19%
19%
19%
18%
18
21%
24%
22%
21
19%
21%
17%
21
20%
21%
20%
20%
22%
23
23%
23
23%
21%
20%
19%
18%
19%
19%
18%
18%
15%
15%
13%
13%
12%
12%
10%
8%
7%
8%
6%
5
4%
4%
5%
6%
7
7%
9%
8%
8%
8%
8%
9%
9%
10%
10%
10%
11
9%
10%
10%
East-
central
Illinois Dec.
farm
price
July Basis Differ-
ence
1956 Crop
1956
April 4 120 142%
11 122 144%
18 124 143%
25 123 143%
May 2 122 142%
9 121 141%
16 118 137%
23 119 138%
31 119 136%
June 6 119 138%
13 122 142%
20 119 138%
27 119 137%
July 5 117 136
11 118 137%
18 120 139%
25 117 137
Aug. 1 118 138%
8 118 138%
15 120% 142%
11 117 139%
29 116 138%
Sept. 6 117 139%
12 115% 137%
10 115% 137%
26 115% 138%
Oct. 3 117 138
10 112% 135%
17 113% 135%
24 116% 137%
31 120 139%
Nov. 7 119% 137%
14 123 136%
21 124% 138%
28 126 137%
Dec. 5 125 134%
12 125 134%
19 122 131
26 122
1957
Jan. 2 122
9 122
16 122
23 121%
30 121
Feb. 6 114
13 116
20 118
27 116
Mar. 5 118%
12 119
19 116
26 117%
April 2 116
9 118
16 118
23 117%
30 118%
May 7 119%
14 120
21 122
28 121
June 4 119%
11 119%
18 119
25 120
July 2 120
9 121%
16 122
49
49%
47%
47%
48%
47%
45%
46%
46%
48%
46%
48%
46%
45%
44%
43%
41
41
40%
40%
42%
40%
39%
35%
36
37%
35%
37%
38%
34%
35%
33%
34
34%
32%
31%
32%
33
33V8
30%
27%
27%
28%
29%
31
31%
28%
22%
22%
19%
20%
20%
20%
19%
19%
17%
19%
20%
19%
18%
19
19%
19%
20
20%
20%
22%
2.'%
223%
22%
21%
22
23%
21
23%
22%
21%
9%
8
3%
3%
1%
9%
8%
9
9
8%
8%
20%
83%
8%
21%
20
9%
9%
9
9
8%
8%
7%
6
6%
5%
3%
2%
3
1%
9%
8%
8%
9%
9%
11
9%
6%
10%
10%
10%
9%
9%
9%
9%
10%
8%
9
9%
12%
8%
8
9%
9%
10
(Table is continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 1.— Continued
East- East-
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
Dec. July Basis Differ-
ence
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
Dec. July Basis Differ-
ence
1957 Crop 1958 Crop
1957 1958
April 4 . . 106 12734 21% 97 118% 21%
11 . 108 129% 21% 11.... 100 119% 19%
18.... 107 128% 21% 18.... 99 120% 21%
25.... . 105 12634 21% 25.... • • 98% 119% 21
May 2 104 125J4 21% May 2 99 119% 20%
9.... . 104 125 % 21%
22%
9.... 97 117% 20%
16.... . 105 127% 16.... 97 117% 20%
23.... . 106% 128J4 21% 23.... 97 118% 21%
29.... . . 104 125% 21% 29.... . . 102 122% 20%
. 100J4 121 5^ 21% June 6.... . . 100 121% 21%
13.... . . 102 123% 21% 13...
.
99 120 21
20.... . 102 123% 21% 20.... . . 100 120% 20%
27.... . 105 126% 21% 27.... .. 101 121% 20%
July 5.... . . 107 12834 21%
21%
July 3.... . . 101 120% 19%
11.... . 107 128J4 11.... 100 120% 20%
18.... 109 130 21 18 . . 105% 125% 20%
25.... 108 128J4 20% 25.... 101 121% 20%
Aug. 1 . . 105% 125% 20% Aug. 1 102 122% 20%
8.... . . 107 127% 20% 8.... 101 119% 18%
15.... . . 104% 125% 21% 15.... 97% 117% 19%
22.... . . 107 127^ 20% 22.... 96 115% 19%
29 . . 102% 123%
12534
133% 20% 10% 29.... 98 117% 126% 19% 9
Sept. 5.... 104% 135 34 20% 9% Sept. 5 97 117 125% 20 8%
12... . . 103 123% 133% 20% 9% 12.... 96 115% 125 19% 9%
19....
. . 102% 123J4 133% 20% 10% 19 95 115% 124% 20 9%
26.... 99 120 130% 21 10% 26.... 97 115 124% 18 9%
Oct. 3.... 100 120% 130% 20% 9% Oct. 3.... 98 113% 122% 15% 9
10.... 100 121 130% 21 9% 10.... 96 113% 122% 17% 9
17.... . . 100% 121% 131% 21% 9% 17.... 95 110% 120% 15% 9%
24.... . . 101 121% 130% 20% 9 24.... .. 93% 109% 119% 15% 10%
31.... 99 118% 127% 19% 9% 31.... .. 94% 110% 119% 15% 9%
Nov. 7 . . .
.
100 117% 128% 17% 10% Nov. 7.... .. 97% 112% 120% 15 8%
14.... 100 118% 127% 18% 8% 14.... 99 112% 120 13% 7%
21.... 105 117% 127 12% 9% 21.... . . 103% 114% 120% 11% 5%
29 . . 105 116% 125% 11% 9 28.... . . 104 113% 120% 9% 7%
Dec. 5 109 119% 125% 16% 6% Dec. 5 105 114% 120 15
4%12 . . 108 11734 126 18 8%
11%
12.... . . 104% 114% 118% 14%
19 . . 105 112% 123% 18% 19.... . . 104% 112% 118% 13% 5%
26.... 104 121% 17% 24.... .. 103% 116% 13
1958 1959
Jan. 2 .. 105 121% 16% Jan. 2 .. 103% 116% 13%
9 .. 10534 121 15% 9.... . . 104 116% 12%
16.... 103 118% 15% 16.... . . 104 115% 11%
23....
. . 101 117% 16% 23.... .. 104% 116% 12%
30.... .. 103J4 116 12% 30.... 104 115% 11%
Feb. 6.... . . 10434 116% 12% Feb. 6.... . . 104% 116% 11%
13.... 105 116% 11% 13.... . . 105 116% 11%
20.... . . 106 118 12 20.... . . 105 117% 12%
27....
.
. 108 119% 11% 27.... 105 119% 14%
Mar. 6.... .. 110J4 120% 10% Mar. 6.... . . 105 119% 14%
13.... 110 121% 11% 13.... . . 106% 119% 13%
20.... . . 109 118% 9% 20 .. 107% 119% 11%
27.... .. 11034 120 9% 26.... . . 109 120% 11%
April 3.... .. 113 122% 9% April 3. . . . .. 112% 123% 11%
10
.
. 120 126% 6% 10.... .. 115% 125% 10
17 . . 122 126% 4% 17.... 116 124% 8%
24.... . . 121 125% 4% 24.... .. 115 124% 9%
May 1 .. 120J4 125% 4% May 1 . . .
.
.. 116% 125% 9
8.... . . 120 125% 5%
4%
8.... .. 116% 124% 8%
8%15.... 120 124% 15.... .. 117% 126%
126%22....
.
. 123 128% 5% 22.... .. 117 9%
29....
.
. 123 130 7 29.... .. 116 124% 8%
. . 121 129% 8% .. 116% 125% 9
12.... 124 132 8 12.... 118 126% 8%
19.... .. 126)4 132 5% 19.... .. 118% 126% 7%
26.... 124 135 11 26.... .. 118 126 8
July 3.... .. 122 132% 10% July 2.... 117 124% 7%
10.... 121 130% 9% 10.... . . 116 123% 7%
17 .. 12334 134% 10% 17 117 125% 8%
(Table is continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 1.— Continued
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Dec. July Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Dec. July Basis Differ-
ence
1959
April 3 95
10 95
17 95
24 95
May 1 96
8 95%
15 96
22 95
29 94
June 5 93%
12 94
19 96
26 98
July 2 97
10 99
17 98
24 98
31 98%
Aug. 7 97
14 97%
21 97
28 97
Sept. 4 96
11 94
18 94
25 94
Oct. 2 94
9 94
16 94
23 95
30 97
Nov. 6 104
13 101
20 101%
27 100
Dec. 4 100
11 100
18 100
24 101
31 104
I960
Jan. 8 105
15 106
22 106
29 105%
Feb. 5 106
12 105%
19 103%
26 104
Mar. 4 105%
11 106%
18 107
25 109
April 1 Ill
8 110%
14 Ill
22 Ill
29 110
May 6 109%
13 110
20 Ill
27 111%
June 3 111%
10 110
17 110
24 108
July 1 109
8 10914
15 109
1959 Crop
4%
5%
4%
5 %
s%
5%
5%
3
3%
35s
5%
5
4%
5
4%
3%
3%
2%
2} 2
2%
i%
2%
0%
09 %
09%
10
09 %
08 h;
09 %
10
13
12%
10%
10%
09%
0951
08 %
118%
11934
117%
117%
117%
118%
118%
117%
118%
118%
120%
120%
ns%
118
118%
118%
118%
118
118%
119%
119%
119%
119%
119%
119
118%
118%
119%
119%
119
120
121%
121%
121%
121%
121%
120%
120%
121%
121%
120
118%
118%
116%
116%
118%
117
9%
9%
20%
9%
9%
9%
9%
20%
9%
20
9%
9%
7
7%
6
6%
5%
5%
5%
5
5%
4%
6%
6%
5%
5%
6
5%
4%
4%
3
9
1%
9
0%
8%
8%
8%
7
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
4%
4%
3%
2%
2
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
1%
0%
0%
8%
8%
8%
8%
7%
9%
7%
7
7%
7%
7%
8%
8%
9%
8%
8%
7%
8
8
7%
8%
8%
9%
1960
April 4.
11.
18.
25.
May 2.
9.
16.
23.
31.
June 6.
13.
20.
27.
5.
11.
18.
25.
1.
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Dec.
15.
22.
29.
6.
12.
19.
26.
3.
10.
17.
24.
31.
Nov. 7
.
14.
21.
28.
5.
12.
19.
27.
1961
Jan. 3.
9.
16.
23.
30.
6.
13.
20.
27.
6.
13.
20.
27.
April 3.
10.
17.
24.
May 1
Feb.
Mar.
15...
22...
29...
June 5...
12...
19 100^
26 100%
July 3 102%
10 103
17 103%
95
95
95
95
94
94
95
97
97
95
95
95
95%
97
96
96
97
98
95
95
99
96%
96
96
95%
95
96
95
94
93
91%
90
85
79
84
90
94
96
99
99%
100
100
101%
105
108%
105
103
103
105
105
103
101
95%
98
100
103
102
102%
104
102
103
104%
101%
1960 Crop
110%
110%
110%
110%
110%
111%
112%
113%
113%
112%
111%
112%
112%
114
113%
111%
112%
113%
111%
110%
110%
110%
110%
110
109%
108%
108%
108%
107%
108%
107%
107%
103%
101
102%
104
101%
100%
118%
118%
118%
118%
*18%
118%
117%
117%
118%
117%
118%
115%
112%
114%
115%
115%
114%
115%
U7%
118%
119
118%
123%
124
122%
120%
121%
123%
»21%
118%
117%
112%
112
112%
116%
119%
116
117%
114
115%
117%
114
112%
112%
114
114%
114%
15%
15%
15%
15%
16%
17%
17%
16%
16%
17%
16%
17%
16%
17
17%
15%
15%
15%
16%
15%
11%
14%
14%
14
13%
13%
12%
9
13%
15%
16%
17%
18%
22
18%
25%
21%
18%
16%
17%
18%
19
17
18%
15%
17%
17%
18%
18%
16%
15%
16%
16%
14
12%
13%
17
13%
13%
12
12%
12%
12%
11%
12%
11%
11%
11
7%
8
8%
8%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
10%
12
11%
12%
11%
14%
14
(Table is concluded on next page)
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Appendix Table 1.— Concluded
Date
East-
central
Illinois Dec.
farm
price
July Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Dec. July Basis Differ-
ence
1961 Crop
1961
April 4 101 117%
11 100 118%
18 100% 118%
25 103 120%
May 2 103 120%
9 104 120%
16 105% 121%
23 104 119%
31 105 121%
June 6 106 122%
13 104 119%
20 103% 119%
27 103% 118%
July 5 106 121%
11 107 122%
18 105 120%
25 104% 119%
Aug. 1 102 116%
8 100 115
15 101 116%
22 100 115%
29 100 114%
Sept. 6 98% 113%
13 97 113%
20 95 111%
27 94 109%
Oct. 3 93 109%
10 94% 110%
17 95 109%
24 97 111%
31 95 108%
Nov. 7 97 109%
14 100 110%
21 102 109%
28 103 109%
Dec. 5 100 107
12 101% 107%
19 101% 107%
26 102
1962
Jan. 2 102%
9 100
16 100
23 102
30 101
Feb. 6 101%
13 101
20 101
27 101
Mar. 6 102
13 102%
20 105%
27 105%
April 3 106
10 104
17 104
24 103%
May 2 103%
9 104%
16 106
23 106%
31 106
June 5 106
12 103%
19 105%
26 104
July 3 105
10 103%
17 101%
25%
24%
25%
23
22
21%
22%
22%
22%
20%
20%
20%
20
18%
18
17%
15%
16%
17%
16%
14%
13%
13%
15
14%
12%
12%
13%
13%
16%
16%
17%
16%
14%
15%
16%
16%
14%
15
14%
14%
10%
12%
10%
11
10%
08%
7%
7%
7%
6%
6%
5%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4
5
5
5
4%
5
5%
5%
4%
4%
6%
6%
5%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
2%
0%
7%
6%
8
6
4%
4%
5
6%
4%
1%
2%
3%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1
1%
0%
1%
2%
0%
2%
2%
1%
8%
8%
8%
8%
7%
7
6%
6
6%
7%
11
11%
12%
11%
12%
12%
12%
12%
11%
12%
11%
9%
10%
8%
11
9%
Mean 1955-61 Crops
April 4 105% 124% 19%
11 105% 124% 19
18 106% 125% 19
25 105% 124% 18%
May 2 105% 124% 18%
9 105% 124% 19
16 105% 124% 18%
23 105% 124% 18%
31 105% 124% 18%
June 6 104% 123% 19
13 104% 123% 18%
20 103% 122% 19
27 105% 123% 18%
July 5 106 124% 18^
11 106 124% 18%
18 106% 124% 18%
25 104% 122% 18
Aug. 1 104% 122% 18
8 103% 121% 18
IS 102% 121% 18%
22 103% 121% 17%
29 102% 120% 129% 18%
Sept. 6 102% 120% 129% 18%
13 101% 119% 129 18%
20 101% 119% 129 18%
27 101% 119% 129% 18%
Oct. 3 101% 118% 128% 17%
10 100% 118% 128 17%
17 99% 117% 127% 17%
24 99% 117% 127% 18%
31 100% 117% 128% 17
Nov. 7 102% 118% 127% 15%
14 101% 117% 126% 15%
21 102% 116% 125^ 14
28 104% 116% 125% 12%
Dec. 5 106% 116% 125% 19%
12 107% 116 125% 18%
19 106% 113% 123% 17%
26 106% 123% 16%
Jan. 2 107% 123% 16%
9 107% 124% 17
16 107 123% 16%
23 107% 123% 15%
30 107% 123% 15%
Feb. 6 107% 123% 15%
13 107% 123% 15%
20 108% 123% 14%
27 107% 123% 15%
Mar. 6 109% 124% 15%
13 109% 124% 14%
20 110 124 14
24 111% 125 13%
April 3 111% 125% 13%
10 114% 126% 12%
17 115% 126% 11%
24 116% 127% 11%
May 2 116 128% 12%
9 116% 127% 10%
16 117 127% 10%
23 117% 127% 9%
31 117 126% 9%
June 5 117% 126% 9
12 117% 126 8%
19 117% 125% 8
26 117 125% 8%
July 3 117% 125% 8%
10 117 125% 8%
17 117% 125% 8%
8%
8%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
10
9%
10%
9%
9%
9%
9%
8%
9%
9%
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Appendix Table 2.— Soybeans: Weekly Prices, Cash Bid to Farmers at Local Ele-
vators in East-Central Illinois, November and July Futures, Basis,
and November-July Spreads, 1955-61 Crop Years
Date
East-
central
Illinois Nov.
farm
price
July Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Nov. July Basis Differ-
ence
1955
April 4 219
11 215
18 216
25 215
May 2 220
9 220
16 217
23 216
31 215 J^
June 6 210
13 214%
20 214
27 213
July 5 212%
11 208%
18 206
25 203
Aug. 1 204%
8 204
15 201
22 205
29 202
Sept. 6 202
12 203%
19 206%
26 233
Oct. 3 222%
10 222)4
17 215
24 208
31 213)4
Nov. 7 216
14 215
21 214
28 213
Dec. 5 220%
12 222
19 222
27 225
1956
Jan. 3 225)4
9 227)4
16 230
23 230
30 233)4
Feb. 6 236)4
13 236
20 244
27 24914
Mar. 5 246%
12 249)4
19 248
26 255
April 2 262
9 271
16 281
23 291
30 310
May 7 312
14 311)4
21 310
28 288)4
June 4 291)4
11 299
18 280
25 284)4
July 2 258)4
9 257
16 251
1955 Crop
236
231%
231)4
233)4
232)4
237)4
235%
233%
233)4
227)|
231%
231
229
228%
225%
222%
220
221%
221%
217%
221%
219%
219
218%
218%
245%
237
236%
232%
229%
236%
235%
235%
244
243%
238%
236
241%
240%
239%
236%
234%
236%
238%
238
241%
242%
248%
248%
247 %
252%
253%
254
266%
269%
264%
266%
264
270%
278
285
295%
306%
324%
324%
324%
322
301
303
313%
295%
299%
274%
272%
266%
17
16%
15%
18%
12%
17%
18%
17%
17%
17%
16%
17
16
15%
16%
16%
17
16%
17%
16%
16%
17%
17
15%
12%
12%
14%
14
17%
21%
23
24%
24%
22%
21%
6
6%
6
6%
7%
20%
8%
7%
9%
7%
8
22%
9%
8
7
6
5%
6
4
4%
5%
4%
2%
2%
2
2%
1%
4%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
7
7
6
6%
5%
4%
4
1956
April 4 225
11 231
18 229
25 238
May 2 230
9 233
16 235
23 231
31 233
June 6 235
13 240
20 235%
27 232
July 5 226
11 226
18 226%
25 218
Aug. 1 219
8 220%
15 224%
22 218%
29 216
Sept. 6 213
12 212%
19 210%
26 209%
Oct. 3 215
10 211%
17 214%
24 219%
31 228
Nov. 7 228
14 238%
21 241
28 245
Dec. 5 236
12 238%
19 233
26 236
1957
Jan. 2 236%
9 237%
16 242%
23 239
30 238%
Feb. 6 232%
13 231%
20 228%
27 232
Mar. 5 233
12 231%
19 229%
26 230%
April 2 230
9 231%
16 226
23 224%
30 226%
May 7 226%
14 226
21 222
28 223
June 4 222
11 221
18 221%
25 222
July 2 224%
9 227%
16 230
1956 Crop
246%
252%
248%
258%
256%
254%
255
252%
252
260
266
260
256
245%
256%
256%
237
237%
239
242%
237%
235%
232%
234
235%
236%
238%
238
241%
243
249%
247
255%
247%
248%
254%
255
260%
257
261%
258%
262%
255%
253%
249%
249%
251%
253%
256%
251%
247%
244
243
238%
240%
243%
239%
236%
237%
237%
240
237%
235
237%
237%
235%
235%
235%
234%
232%
231%
233%
238%
242%
247
21%
21%
19%
20%
26%
21%
20
21%
19
25
26
24%
24
19%
19%
19%
19
18%
18H
18%
19
19%
19%
21%
25%
25
23%
26%
27
23%
21%
29
22%
17%
17%
19%
15%
16%
13%
15
16%
14
12%
9
11%
11%
10%
8%
10%
8%
7%
6%
7%
8%
11%
10%
10%
10%
9%
13%
12%
12%
11%
10
11%
13%
14%
17
10%
12%
12
11
10
6
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Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Nov. July Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois Nov.
farm
price
July Basis Dp^"ence
1957
April 4 205
11 206
18 205
25 203
May 2 202
9 203
16 203
23 203
31 201%
June 6 200
13 200
20 202
27 205
July 5 208
11 213
18 223
25 217
Aug. 1 215
8 218%
15 220%
22 217%
29 217%
Sept. 5 216
12 214%
19 212
26 208
Oct. 3 207
10 212
17 212H
24 209
31 208
Nov. 7 212
14 213
21 217
29 217
Dec. 5 217%
12 215
19 214
26 212
1958
Jan. 2 212%
9 213%
16 214
23 214
30 212
Feb. 6 213%
13 213
20 215
27 214%
Mar. 6 217
13 217J^
20 217
27 218%
April 3 219%
10 222
17 222%
24 219%
May 1 220
8 220
15 219
22 220
29 221
June 5 219
12 220
19 218%
26 219
July 3 219
10 219
17 226
1957 Crop
227
228
225%
224%
223%
224%
224%
224%
222%
220%
221%
223%
227%
229%
234%
244%
238%
236
239
241
237%
237%
236%
234%
232%
229%
227%
230%
233%
228%
226%
229%
227
234
239%
242
237
236%
239%
236%
238%
238%
237%
233%
232%
230
229%
230%
230%
229%
225%
227%
226%
227
227%
228%
227%
227%
228%
233
233%
230%
229%
227%
227
228%
229%
226%
227%
224%
224%
224%
224%
235
22%
17
16%
16%
15%
13%
14
13%
13%
12%
10%
10%
10%
9%
9%
11
11%
11
9%
7%
8%
8%
7%
7%
5%
5%
5%
5%
9
6%
8%
8%
8%
9%
10%
3
8
1958
April 3 198%
11 203
18 206
25 201
May 2 202%
9 201
16 201
23 202
29 205
June 6 201
13 203
20 202
27 202%
July 3 202
11 202
18 211
25 204%
Aug. 1 206
8 202
15 202
22 200
29 203
Sept. 5 202
12 201
19 200
26 200
Oct. 3 199
10 201
17 197%
24 194
31 194
Nov. 7 198
14 198
21 201
28 201
Dec. 5 203
12 206
19 209
24 209
195 9
Jan. 2 207
9 209
16 210%
23 211%
30 210%
Feb. 6 211%
13 212
20 210
27 212
Mar. 6 212
13 213
20 213%
26 214%
April 3 215%
10 216%
17 218
24 219%
May 1 220
8 221
15 220%
22 219
29 216
June 5 215%
12 217
19 216%
26 217
July 2 217
10 213
17 215
1958 Crop
219%
223%
226%
221%
222%
221%
221%
222%
225%
221%
222%
221%
222
221%
222
230%
224%
224%
222%
222%
219%
223
221%
220%
218%
219%
216
216%
213%
210%
210%
214
213%
225%
225%
223%
222%
223
226%
225
224%
223
223%
222
222
219%
218%
218
219%
220
219%
220%
221%
221%
224%
224%
225%
225%
226%
227%
228%
228%
228%
228%
229%
229%
228%
225%
224%
224%
223%
224%
223%
218%
220%
21%
20%
20%
20%
20
20%
20%
20%
20%
20%
19%
19%
19%
19%
20
19%
19%
18%
20%
20%
19%
20
19%
19%
18%
19%
17
15%
16
16%
16%
28%
27
23%
22
20%
16
13
10%
11%
9
8%
8%
9%
9
9%
11%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
11%
11%
10%
9%
8%
8%
9%
9%
9%
9%
7%
6%
7%
6%
5%
5%
9%
9%
10
11%
12%
12%
11%
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Appendix Table 2.— Continued
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Nov. July Basis
Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Nov. July Basis Differ-
ence
1959
April 3 194
10 195
17 193
24 192
May 1 193
8 193
15 195
22 1944
29 193
June 5 1904
12 191
19 1934
26 1934
July 2 191
10 194
17 200
24 203*4
31 203
Aug. 7 199
14 195
21 195
28 193
Sept. 4 1944
11 194
18 1934
25 191
Oct. 2 197
9 199
16 199
23 198
30 201
Nov. 6 209
13 208
20 206
27 207
Dec. 4 208
11 204
18 202
24 205
31.... 206
1960
Jan. 8 208
15 207
22 208
29 206
Feb. 5 205
12 2034
19 2034
26 202
Mar. 4 203
11 204
18 205
25 207,4
April 1 212
8 212
14 2074
22 207}^
29 206
May 6 2074
13 206
20 2074
27 2064
June 3 207
10 205
17 204
24 204
July 1 205
8 205
15 205
1959 Crop
2134
2144
213
211M
211%
2114
2134
2134
2124
2084
2094
2124
212
2104
2114
2184
2204
2204
2164
2134
2124
2104
212
2104
2084
209
2134
2154
2124
2144
217
2234
2214
2244
2254
2234
2254
2284
232
2294
225
2254
2284
2224
2174
2184
2194
2214
2184
2184
2164
2154
215
2144
2134
2154
2164
2154
217
2194
2174
216
2154
2154
2154
2144
2154
2144
2144
212
211
2114
2134
2124
2134
94
94
20
94
84
84
84
9
94
84
84
84
84
94
74
84
64
74
74
84
74
74
74
64
5
8
64
64
64
6
23
214
9
84
204
84
54
34
34
34
14
04
04
04
14
14
14
24
24
04
94
74
54
84
74
94
84
74
7
7
74
84
74
84
104
10
104
114
114
84
74
I960
April 4 188
11 190
18 190
25 188
May 2 190
9 188
16 190
23 191
31 190
June 6 189
13 189
20 189
27 190
July 5 192
11 191
18 193
25 195
Aug. 1 202
8 200
15 200
22 2014
29 201
Sept. 6 2014
12 201
19 200
26 198
Oct. 3 200
10 2014
17 2004
24 1994
31 2004
Nov. 7 205
14 201
21 2014
28 203
Dec. 5 206
12 210
19 214
27 220
1961
Jan. 3 229
9 232
16 236
23 2314
30 252
Feb. 6 2554
13 257
20 2624
27 290
Mar. 6 291
13 273
20 285
27 296
April 3 295
10 310
17 305
24 313
May 1 318
8 297
15 308
22 294
29 288
June 5 295
12 263
19 263
26 254
July 3 267
10 260
17 254
1960 Crop
2094
2094
209
2084
2094
2084
2104
210
210
2094
2074
2074
2084
2114
2104
211
2134
2194
2174
2154
2164
2154
2164
2154
2134
2124
2124
2134
2144
2164
2174
217J?
2134
214
194
19
204
194
204
204
21
20
204
184
184
184
194
194
18
184
174
174
154
144
144
154
144
134
144
2244 124 114
2254 124 114
226 134 114
2294 174 124
231 164 134
231 26 134
2264 254 13
2254 24
226 23
226 20
224 14
224 10
2284 84
2424 134
2484 164
256 20
250 184
2714 194
276 204
2774 204
2814 194
308 18
3094 184
288 15
292 7
3034 74
3024 74
323 13
3204 154
3244 114
3274 94
3054 84
3114 34
2974 34
2924 44
2984 34
2674 44
2674 44
2614 74
2754 84
262 2
2544 04
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Appendix Table 2.— Concluded
East-
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
Nov. July
ence
1961 Crop
1961
. . 223 24234 19%
11.... .. 228 248 20
18.... . . 230 249J4 19%
25.... . . 243 261J4 18%
May 2 . . 240 25834 18%
9.... . . 237% 25534 17%
18%16.... . . 235 25334
23 . . 233 25034 17%
31.... . . 233 25034 17%
. . 233 250 17
13.... . . 227 245% 18%
20.... . . 227 24534 18%
27.... . . 229 24634 17%
July 5.... . . 234 251 16
11.... . . 233 250% 17%
18 .. 231 248 17
25.... . . 230 250% 20%
. . 228 244% 16%
8 .. 228 244% 16%
15.... . . 226 242% 16%
22 ...
.
. .
227 24334 16%
15%29.... .. 227 242%
Sept. 6 . . 224 239% 15%
13.... . . 223 239J4 16%
20.... . . 220% 23734 16%
27.... . . 222 237% 15%
Oct. 3 . . . . . 225 238% 25334 13% 14%
10.... .. 226% 238% 25334 11% 15%
17.... . . 230 239% 253% 9% 14%
24.... . . 231 242% 253% 11% 11
31 . . 233 240% 251% 7% 11%
Nov. 7.... . . 235 24234 251% 16% 9%
14.... . . 235 242J4 25034 15% 6
21.... . . 236 24934 13%
28.... . . 236 246% 10%
Dec. 5 . . 238 247% 9%
12 . . 238 247% 9%
19 .. 238 247% 9%
26.... . . 239 247% 8%
1962
Jan. 2.... . . 23934 24934 9%
9 .. 238 249% 11%
16 .. 237)4 248% 11%
23 ... .. 237 248 11
30.... .. 23714 248% 10%
Feb. 6.... . . 238 248% 10%
13 . . 238% 248% 10%
20.... . . 235 246% 11%
27.... .. 235 247 12
. .
236 248% 12%
13.... .. 240 247% 7%
20 .. 241% 248% 7
27.... . . 243 249 6
. .
244 248% 4%
10.... . . 245 249% 4%
17.... .. 245 249% 434
3%24.... . . 246 24934
May 2 .. 245J4 249 3%
9.... .. 245 248% 3%
16 . . 244 248% 4%
23.... .. 24234 247 4%
31.... . . 242 247% 5%
June 5 .. 24134 247% 6
12.... .. 239 247 8
19.... . . 241 250 9
26.... . . 24034 249% 9%
July 3.... .. 240 249% 9%
10.... . . 24034 249% 9%
17.... .. 241 254% 13%
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
Nov. July Basis Differ-
ence
Mean 1955-61 Crops
April 4 207%
11 209%
18 209%
25 211%
May 2 211
9 210%
16 210%
23 210
31 210%
June 6 208%
13 209%
20 209
27 209%
July 5 209%
11 209%
18 212%
25 210%
Aug. 1 211%
8 210%
15 210
22 208%
29 208%
Sept. 6 207%
13 207
20 206%
27 208%
Oct. 3 209%
10 210%
17 209%
24 208%
31 211%
Nov. 7 214%
14 215%
21 216%
28 216%
Dec. 5 218%
12 219
19 218%
26 220%
Jan. 2 222%
9 223%
16 225%
23 224%
30 227%
Feb. 6 227%
13 227%
20 228%
27 233%
Mar. 6 234%
13 232%
20 234%
27 237%
April 3 239%
10 240
17 243%
24 245%
May 2 249%
9 247
16 247%
23 245
31 240%
June 5 241%
12 237%
19 234%
26 234%
July 3 233
10 231%
17 231%
227%
229%
228%
231%
230%
230%
230%
229%
229%
228%
229%
230%
228%
228%
228%
231%
229%
229%
228%
227%
226J4
226%
225%
224%
223%
227%
226%
226%
226%
226%
228%
229%
229%
20%
20
19
19%
19%
19%
19%
19%
19%
19%
19%
21%
19%
18%
19
18%
19
18%
18%
17%
17%
17%
17%
17%
17%
18%
236 17 9%
237% 16% 10%
2373% 16% 10%
237 18% 10%
238% 17% 10%
239% 25 9%
238% 22% 8%
236% 20%
1934236%
236% 18%
234% 15%
233 14%
233% 12%
12%234%
238% 14%
239% 14%
237% 13%
240%
240%
13%
13%
240% 13%
242% 14%
247%
247%
13%
13%
244% 11%
244% 10%
247% 9%
249 9%
253% 13%
254% 10%
255% 9%
259 9%
255% 8%
255% 7%
253% 8%
249% 8%
250 8%
246% 8%
243% 8%
243% 9%
242% 9%
240% 8%
241% 10
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Appendix Table 3.— Oats: Weekly Prices, Cash Bid to Farmers at Local Elevators
in East-Central Illinois, July and March Futures, Basis,
and July-March Spreads, 1955-61 Crop Years
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
1955
Jan. 3 59
10 59
17 59
24 60
31 60
Feb. 7 59%
14 58
21 58
28 57
Mar. 7 54
14 56
21 54
28 55J4
April 4 55
11 55
18 57
25 57
May 2 56
9 57
16 57
23 59
31 58%
June 6 56
13 56
20 55
27 56
July 5 53%
11 53%
18 50%
25 49%
Aug. 1 50%
8 48
15 48
22 47
29 46
Sept. 6 48
12 49
19 51
26 53
Oct. 3 53%
10 56%
17 55J4
24 55%
31 57
Nov. 7 58
14 57
21 58%
28 58
Dec. 5 59%
12 59%
19 59%
27 60
1956
Jan. 3 59%
9 60
16 57
23 57
30 57
Feb. 6 58
13 57%
20 57
„ 27 56%
Mar. 5 55
12 56
19 56%
1955 Crop
n$i
71 ji
70%
71%
71
70%
70%
69%
68%
65%
67%
65%
66%
65%
64%
67%
67%
66%
67%
67%
69%
68%
65%
67%
65%
65%
64
63%
60%
69%
70%
69H
69%
(>m
68%
66
63%
64%
63%
64
64
63%
64%
64%
66%
68
66%
67%
65%
65%
67%
68%
67%
67%
65%
64%
63%
64%
65%
66
66%
64%
64%
64%
65
63
63%
62%
60%
61%
61%
12%
12%
11%
11%
11
11%
12%
11%
11%
11%
11%
11%
10%
10%
9%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
10%
9%
9%
11%
10%
9%
15
14%
15%
14%
14%
15%
16
17
17%
16%
15%
15%
15
13%
10%
10%
10
10%
10%
10%
9%
7%
5
3%
4%
5%
6%
6%
7%
7%
7%
7
S%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%
3%
3%
3%
4
4%
5
5%
1956
Jan. 3 50
10 51
17 50
24 50
31 51
Feb. 7 51
14 50
21 52
28 51
Mar. 7 51
14 48
21 51
28 53
April 4 54
11 55
18 54
25 57
May 2 55
9 56
16 56
23 55
31 54
June 6 54
13 57
20 56%
27 56%
July 5 58%
11 63
18 65
25 63%
Aug. 1 65%
8 64
15 65
22 61
29 60
Sept. 6 61%
12 62%
19 62%
26 63
Oct. 3 63%
10 65%
17 70
24 72
31 72
Nov. 7 72
14 71%
21 74%
28 75
Dec. 5 72
12 73
19 74
26 73%
1957
Jan. 2 73
9 73
16 73%
23 73
30 72
Feb. 6 67
13 68
20 68
27 67
Mar. 5 69
12 69
19 64
1956 Crop
63%
64%
63%
63%
64%
63%
63
64
62%
63%
62%
64%
65%
66%
66%
66%
68%
66%
67%
67%
66
65%
64%
67%
66%
66%
68%
71%
75%
71
74
72%
72%
75%
77%
76%
75%
77%
77%
78%
77%
77%
78%
78
78%
78%
78%
78
80%
81%
82%
80%
80%
79%
80%
78
77%
78%
78
77%
78%
79%
79%
78%
75%
75%
76
74%
75%
75%
72
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
3
2
1%
2%
4%
3%
2%
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
0%
0%
9%
9%
6%
4%
1%
2%
1%
3%
3%
6%
7%
6%
5%
6
5%
4%
2%
0%
9%
10"%
5%
5%
6
4%
4%
4%
4%
5%
6%
6%
6%
8%
7%
8
7%
6%
6%
8
6%
6%
6%
6%
7
6
1%
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East- East-
Date
central
Illinois July March Basis Differ- Date
central
Illinois July March Basis Differ-
farm farm
price price
1957 Crop 1958 Crop
1957 1958
56 70 4 43 58% 15%
10 56 70% 4% 10.... 43 57%
17 57% 71% 4% 17.... 42 57% 15%
24 57 7iy 4^ 24.... 43 57% 14%
31 55% 69% 4 31.... 43 57% 14%
Feb. 7 57 67% 0% Feb. 7.... 45 58% 13%
14 57 67% OK 14.... 46 59 13
21 56 67% 1% 21.... 47 60% 13%
28 56 66% 0% 28.... 47 61 14
Mar. 7 57 66% 9% Mar. 7.... 48 62% 14%
14 55 65% o>/? 14.... 48 62 14
21 53 64% Ll% 21.... 49 61%
62% !!P28 55 65% 10% 28.... 4953 65% L2K 49 62% 13%
11 57 67% 10% 11 50 62% 12%
18 57 67% OK 18.... 49 61% 12%
25 57 66% 9% 25.... 47 60% 13%
May 2 55 66 .1 May 2 47 59% 12%
9 56 67% 11% 9.... .. 46% 60% 13%
16 56 67 1 16.... 47 60 13
23 56 66% 10% 23.... 49 60%
&B31 55% 65% 29.... 50 62%
June 6 53 62% 69%
70%
9% 6% June 6 50 62 68% 12 6%
13 53% 64% OU 5% 13.... 50 61% 68% 11% 6%
20 54J4 64% 70% OH 6 20 52 63% 68% 11% 5%
27 58 67% 72% 9Ks 5% 27.... 53 63% 69% 10% 6
July 5 58 67%
67%
73% 15% 5% July 3.... .. 53% 64% 70% 17% 6%
11 58 73% sy*. 5% 11.... 53 65 70% 17% 5%
18 58% 63 71% 13 % 3% 18.... .. 54% 65% 71% 17% 6%
25 58 71% 3% 25.... .. 53% 68 14%
Aug. 1 57 70% 13% 55 68% 13%
14%8 57 69% 2% 8.... 54 68%
15 58 70% ;2% 15.... 53 66% 13%
22 59 71% 2% 22.... 51 66% 15%
29 60 70% ;0% 29 52 68 16
Sept. 5 60 71% 11% Sept. 5 51 67% 16%
12 59 71% 12VS 12.... 50 67% 17%
19 58 70% 12% 19 50 67% 17%
26 55 68 13 26.... 50 66% 16%
Oct. 3 59 69% 10% Oct. 3.... 50 66 16
10 59 69 10 10.... 50 66 16
17 61 69% 8% 17.... 50 66 16
24 61 68% 7% 24.... 50 65% 15%
31 61 67% 6H 31.... 50 65% 15%
Nov. 7 62 68% 6% Nov. 7.... • • 51% 67 15%
14 63 67% 4% 14.... 53 67% 14%
21 64 67 3 21 54 67% 13%
29 64 66% 2% 28.... 53 65% 12%
Dec. 5 64 67 3 Dec. 5 57 66% 9%
12 64 65% 1% 12.... 58 66% 8%
19 64 65% 1% 19 58 63% 5%
26 63 63% 0% 24.... 59 65 6
1958 1959
Jan. 2 62 63% 1% Jan. 2 . . .
.
57 65% 8%
9 63 65 2 9.... 58 66% 8%
16 63 65 2 16.... 57 66% 9%
23 60% 62% 2 23 ... 57 67% 10%
30 57% 62% 5% 30.... 58 66 8
Feb. 6 58 64% 6% Feb. 6.... 58 66% 8%
13 58% 65 6% 13 57 66 9
20 59 65% 6%
6%
20 54 64% 10%
27 57% 63% 27.... .. 54% 65% 11%
59 65% 6% 54 64% 10%
13 59% 67 7% 13.... .. 54 65% 11%
20 59% 67% 7% 19 55 64% 9%
(Table is continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 3.— Continued
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
Jan. 2 47
9 47
16 47
23 SO
30 49%
Feb. 6 50
13 SO
20 49
27 50
Mar. 6 53
13 52
20 53
26 54
April 3 53
10 56
17 53%
24 53
May 1 54
8 5434
15 54
22 54
29 52
June 5 52
12 54
19 55
26 56
July 2 56
10 58
17 62
24 63
31 63%
Aug. 7 62
14 61
21 59
28 60
Sept. 4 63
11 60
18 57
25 58
Oct. 2 59
9 62
16 62
23 63
30 69
Nov. 6 69
13 69
20 69
27 70
Dec. 4 71
11 71
18 71
24 72
31 72
1960
Jan. 8 72
15 72
22 72
29 68
Feb. 5 68
12 68
19 68
26 66
Mar. 4 69
11 67
18 70
1959 Crop
61
%
61
61
62%
61%
61H
61%
6oys
62%
62%
62%
64%
65%
65
67
64%
63%
65
64%
65%
63%
63
63%
66
66%
66%
67
66%
67%
67%
70
71%
72
71%
70%
70
70
71%
71%
71
70
70%
71%
71%
70M
71%
71%
72U
73%
74
75%
76%
78
75%
75^
76%
76
74%
75%
75%
76%
77%
76
75%
75
74%
73%
73%
75%
75%
75
3%
4
5
5%
4%
3M
2%
1960
Jan. 4 55
11 56
18 56
25 56
Feb. 1 55%
8 56
15 56
23 55%
29 55%
Mar. 7 57
14 59%
21 60
28 60
April 4 61%
11 61
18 61
25 61%
May 2 62
9 63
16 58%
23 60
31 60
June 6 57%
13 62
20 62
27 60
July 5 61
11 61
18 60
25 58
Aug. 1 58%
8 56
15 57
22 57
29 57
Sept. 6 55
12 53
19 53
26 53
Oct. 3 53
10 54
17 54
24 54
31 52
Nov. 7 53
14 51
21 51
28 51
Dec. 5 51
12 55
19 55
27 56%
1961
Jan. 3 57%
9 58
16 60
23 58
30 59
Feb. 6 59
13 58%
20 56%
27 56%
Mar. 6 55
13 56%
20 54
1960 Crop
66
67
67%
67%
66%
66%
57
66%
66%
68»^
70%
71%
71%
72%
71%
72%
72%
73%
74
73%
72%
72%
70 \i
70%
70%
70%
71%
70%
67%
75%
76
75%
75%
76%
74%
73H
73%
7W%
73%
72 ii
73%
73%
73%
72%
71 JS
69%
70%
70%
68%
68%
67%
67H
62U
62%
63%
63
64%
64^
61%
65%
67*i
65%
65%
67%
67Vi
65%
63
63
63%
64%
60%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
W%
6
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Appendix Table 3.— Concluded
East-
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-ence
1961 Crop
1961
53 67% 14%
10 52 67% 15%
17.... 52 67% 15%
24.... 52 66% 14%
31.... 54 69%
70%
15%
Feb. 7.... 55 15%
14 54 69% 15%
21.... 53 67
%
14%
28.... 53 67% 14%
Mar. 7.... 50 67% 17%
14.... 50 68% 18%
21 50 65% 15%
28.... 47 62 15
50 63% 13%
11 49 63 14
18.... 51 63% 12%
25.... 53 66 13
May 2 53 66% 13%
9.... 54 66% 12%
16.... 54 67% 13%
23 54 65% 11%
31.... 55 67% 12%
June 6 55 66% 75 11% 8%
13.... 54 65% 74% 11% 8%
20.... 55 66% 74% 11% 7%
27 57 69% 76% 12% 6%
July 5.... 58 71 77% 19% 6%
11 62 73% 78% 16% 5%
18.... 62 73% 77% 15% 4%
25.... 61 77% 16%
Aug. 1 58 75% 17%
8 56 75% 19%
20%15.... 58 78%
22.... .. 58J4 78% 19%
29.... 58 77% 19%
Sept. 6 57 78% 21%
13.... 58 78% 20%
20.... 56 75% 19%
27.... 54 74% 20%
Oct. 3 53 723% 19%
10.... 53 72% 19%
18%17.... 55 73%
24.... 55 72% 17%
31.... 55 70% 15%
Nov. 7.... 57 71% 14%
14.... 60 71% 11%
21 60 71% 11%
28.... 61 71 10
Dec. 5 61 70% 9%
12 63 72% 9%
19 .. 63 71% 8%
26.... 63 71% 8%
1962
Jan. 2 64 72% 8%
9.... 62 73% 11%
16.... 62 71 9
23 57 67% 10%
30.... 57 68 11
Feb. 6.... 57 67% 10%
13.... 55 65% 10%
20.... 53 62% 9%
27.... 55 63 8
Mar. 6 57 65% 8%
13.... 57 64% 7%
20.... 58 67% 9%
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis
Mean 1955-61 Crops
Jan. 3 52%
10 52
17 51%
24 52%
31 52%
Feb. 7 53%
14 53
21 52%
28 52%
Mar. 7 52%
14 52%
21 52%
28 53%
April 4 53%
11 54%
18 54%
25 55
May 2 54%
9 55%
16 54%
23 55%
31 55
June 6 53%
13 55%
20 55%
27 56%
July 5 56%
11 58%
18 58%
25 58%
Aug. 1 58%
8 56%
15 57%
22 56
29 56%
Sept. 6 56%
13 56
20 55%
27 55%
Oct. 3 55%
10 57%
17 58%
24 58%
31 59%
Nov. 7 60%
14 60%
21 61%
28 61%
Dec. 5 62ys
12 63%
19 63%
26 63%
Jan. 2 63%
9 63%
16 63%
23 62
30 61%
Feb. 6 60%
13 60%
20 59%
27 59
Mar. 6 59%
13 59%
20 59%
65% 12%
65% 3%
65% 13%
65% 13%
65% 3
65%
IS65%
65%
65!/R 2%
65% 13%
65% 13%
65% 12%
65% 12%
65% 12%
11%66%
66 1%
66% 11%
66% 11%
66% 11%
66% 2%
66% 11%
66% 11%
65)/* 70% 11% 5%
66% 71% 11 5%
66% 71% 0% 5%
67 72% 0% 5%
67% 73% 16% 5%
68% 73% 14% 5
68% 72% 13% 4%
71% 13%
13%71%
71% 14%
71% 14%
71% 15%
71% 15%
72 15%
72 6
71% 16%
70% 15%
70% .5
70% 13%
71 2%
70% 12%
70% 11%
71% 1
70% 9%
70% 8%
69% 8%
69% 7%
69% 6
69% 5%
69 5%
69% 5%
70% 6%
69% 6%
68% 6%
69 7%
68% 8%
67% 7%
66% 7%
66% 7%
67 7%
67% 7%
67 7%
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Appendix Table 4.— Wheat: Weekly Prices, Cash Bid to Farmers at Local Elevators
in East-Central Illinois, July and March Futures, Basis,
and July-March Spreads, 1955-61 Crop Years
East-
central Differ
Date Illinois July March Basis '
farm
price
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
1955
Jan. 3 197
10 190%
17 189
24 194
31 194
Feb. 7 192
14 192
21 185
28 183
Mar. 7 180
14 184
21 181
28 181
April 4 180
11 177
18 176
25 178
May 2 177
9 184
16 185%
23 188
31 187
June 6 185
13 188
20 186
27 186%
July 5 185%
11 188
18 186
25 183
Aug. 1 178%
8 176
15 176
22 176
29 173
Sept. 6 173
12 177
19 178
26 182
Oct. 3 183
10 186
17 183
24 183
31 183
Nov. 7 183
14 180
21 182%
28 181
Dec. 5 190
12 191
19 192
27 190
1956
Jan. 3 198%
9 199
16 196
23 197
30 198
Feb. 6 200
13 203
20 209
27 209
Mar. 5 207
12 209
19 210
1955 Crop
215
213%
210%
213%
213
212%
211%
204%
201%
197
201%
197%
198
196%
194%
194%
195%
194%
201
199%
201
199%
196%
201
197
199%
198%
203%
199%
204%
204%
201%
200%
202%
198%
202%
203%
207%
204%
202%
200%
197%
196
196
195%
200%
202%
202%
206%
205%
206%
204
200%
206%
207%
205%
205%
203%
205%
209%
209%
209
212%
210%
210%
206%
207%
214%
216%
220%
219%
220%
223%
226%
16
22%
21%
19%
19
20%
19%
19%
18%
17
17%
16%
17
16%
17%
18%
17%
17%
17
13%
13
12%
11%
13
11
13%
13
19%
18%
19%
21%
21%
20
20
22%
27%
25%
24%
22%
20%
21
17%
23%
24%
25%
23%
22%
15%
18%
17%
19
13%
11%
14%
9%
9%
14%
13%
11%
10%
13%
14%
16%
5%
3%
2%
3%
1%
1%
2%
4%
3%
4%
1956
Jan. 3 175
10 176
17 170%
24 172
31 173
Feb. 7 172%
14 176
21 180
28 180
Mar. 7 179
14 175
21 179
28 189
April 4 189
11 193
18 189
25 191
May 2 193
9 188
16 189
23 189
31 185
June 6 189
13 190%
20 189%
27 186%
July 5 185%
11 185%
18 193%
25 193
Aug. 1 192%
8 192
15 197
22 197
29 198
Sept. 6 203%
12 207
19 207
26 207
Oct. 3 204
10 204%
17 208
24 209
31 214
Nov. 7 212
14 218
21 220
28 228%
Dec. 5.... 223%
12 226%
19 225%
26 225
1957
Jan. 2 225
9 223
16 227
23 225
30 221
Feb. 6 215
13 213
20 214%
27 214
Mar. 5 215%
12 215%
19 206%
1956 Crop
198%
198%
196%
195%
197%
197%
196%
199%
199%
198%
198%
200%
208%
211%
212%
209%
214%
209%
205%
208%
205%
203%
206%
208%
208%
206%
206%
205%
214%
213%
209%
209%
212%
215%
215%
214
214%
214%
221%
221%
223%
224
228%
228%
229%
231%
231%
233%
234%
233%
233%
236
237%
242%
240%
242%
241
242%
238%
239%
239%
241
241%
240%
243%
241%
237%
231%
231%
232%
231%
233%
231
220%
23%
22%
26
23%
24%
24%
20%
19%
19%
19%
23%
21%
19
^22%
19%
20%
23%
16%
17%
19%
17%
18%
17%
17%
18%
19%
29
28%
28%
28%
30%
32
31%
31%
31%
27%
24%
26%
27%
29%
28%
28
28%
28%
28%
24%
21
14%
14%
13
14%
16
16%
17%
16%
16%
16%
16%
18%
17%
17%
18%
15%
14
4%
4%
5%
5%
7%
7%
7%
8
9
7%
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Appendix Table 4.— Continued
Date
East-
central
Illinois July
farm
price
March Basis Differ-
ence
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
7%
9%
9%
8%
8%
9%
8%
9H
s%
6%
1957 Crop
1957
Jan. 3 207 229%
10 207 228%
17 210 231%
24 207 228%
31 203 224%
Feb. 7 201% 222%
14 203% 224%
21 202 224%
28 203% 224%
Mar. 7 202 223%
14 201 222%
21 196 217%
28 195 216%
April 4 193 213%
11 196 215%
18 193 214
25 190 210%
May 2 187 207%
9 187% 208%
16 189 209% 216%
23 185 205% 215
31 182% 203% 212%
June 6 181 202% 210%
13 181 202% 211%
20 184% 205% 214%
27 196 214 222%
July 5 192 209% 219%
11 193% 212% 221%
18 196 215% 221%
25 190 219%
Aug. 1 195 221%
8 195 223%
15 197 226%
22 198 227%
29 192% 225
Sept. 5 198 227
12 194% 224%
19 192 221%
26 188 220%
Oct. 3 189 220%
10 193 223%
17 194 225%
24 190 221%
31 191 222%
Nov. 7 199 224%
14 194 224%
21 194 223%
29 195 224%
Dec. 5 201% 224%
12 203% 222%
19 200 219%
26 204% 220%
1958
Jan. 2 203% 219%
9 206% 220%
16 205% 218
23 205% 217%
30 205% 217%
Feb. 6 203% 216%
13 202 214%
20 205% 218%
27 206 220%
Mar. 6 206 222%
13 208 226%
20 204 222%
22%
21%
21%
21%
21%
21%
21%
22%
21
21%
21%
21%
21%
20%
19%
21
20%
20%
20%
20%
20%
20%
21%
21%
20%
18
27%
27%
25%
29%
26%
28%
29%
29%
32%
29
29%
29%
32%
31%
30%
31%
31%
31%
25%
30%
29%
29%
22%
19%
19%
16%
16%
14%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
13%
14%
16%
18%
18%
1958
Jan. 3 166
10 165
17 166
24 162
31 164
Feb. 7 164
14 167
21 169
28 169
Mar. 7 172
14 169
21 169
28 168
April 3 165
11 166%
18 166%
25 163
May 2 164
9 162
16 161
23 164
29 165
June 6 163
13 165%
20 164
27 164
July 3 159
11 166
18 170%
25 165
Aug. 1 165
8 164
15 163
22 163
29 168
Sept. 5 168
12 169
19 169
26 174
Oct. 3 172
10 172
17 172
24 171
31 172
Nov. 7 172
14 176
21 176
28 175
Dec. 5 176
12 176
19 179
24 176
1959
Jan. 2 179
9 180
16 181
23 183
30 183%
Feb. 6 183%
13 184
20 181%
27 187
Mar. 6 186
13 187%
19 185
1958 Crop
189%
188%
188
186
187%
187%
191%
194%
193%
196
192
190%
190%
188%
190%
189%
186%
186%
184%
184
185%
186%
183%
186%
184%
185%
181%
185%
190%
96
97%
98%
94%
97
94%
96%
93%
96%
201%
95%
95%
95%
95%
93%
97%
96%
97%
96%
99%
99%
200%
200%
97%
97%
99%
99%
99%
98%
98%
96%
96%
94%
96%
97%
96
97%
97%
96%
98%
97%
203
206%
208
208%
23%
23%
22
24
23%
23%
24%
25%
24%
24
23
21%
22%
23%
24%
23%
23%
22%
22%
23
21%
21%
20%
21
20%
21%
34%
30%
31%
30%
30%
31%
32%
30%
29%
28%
28%
27%
25%
27%
28%
28%
26%
25%
27%
23%
23%
23%
22%
20%
17%
18%
17%
17%
15
14%
14%
12%
14%
16%
16
20%
21%
23%
12
12%
12%
11%
10%
9%
11%
12%
10%
11%
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Appendix Table 4.— Continued
East- East-
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
1959 Crop 1960 Crop
1959 1960
Jan. 2 .. 152% 181% 29% Jan. 4.... 162 182% 20%
9.... . . 158% 182 23% 11... . . . 165% 183% 18%
16.... . . 160 182 22 18.... 163 183% 20%
23.... . . 160 183% 23% 25.... 164 185 21
30.... . . 160 183% 23% Feb. 1 . . . . 162 184% 22%
Feb. 6.... .. 161 183% 22% 8.... 162 184% 22%
13.... . . 162 184% 22% 15.... 164 185% 21%
20.... . . 162 185 23 23 164 185 21
27.... . . 165 188% 23% 29.... 164 184% 20%
Mar. 6.... . . 164 187% 23% Mar. 7.... 166 184% 18%
13 . . 165 187% 22% 14.... 166 184% 18%
20.... . . 164 186% 22% 21... . 169 183% 14%
26.... . . 164 185% 21% 28.... 169 183% 14%
April 3.... . . 166 187% 21% April 4.... 169 185% 16%
10.... . . 168 189% 21% 11... . 170 184% 14%
17.... .. 167 187% 20% 18.... . . 169 184% 15%
24.... . . 167 188% 21% 25.... 170 184 14
167 187% 20% May 2 . . 171 184% 13%
8.... . . 165 185% 20% 9.... 172 185% 13%
15.... 166 187 197% 21 10% 16.... 173 185% 196% 12% 11%
22.... 164 183% 195% 19% 11% 23.... 174 186 197% 12 11%
29.... . . 163% 183% 195% 20% 11% 31.... 173 184% 196% 11% 11%
June 5.... . . 162 183 195% 21 12% June 6. . . . . . 173% 184% 196% 11 12
12.... . . 163% 184% 197% 20% 12% 13.... 174 184% 197% 10% 12%
19.... 168 186% 199 18% 12% 20.... . . 173% 182% 195% 9% 13%
26.... .. 174 186% 199 12% 12% 27.... 173 182% 195% 9% 12%
July 2.... 179 187% 199% 20% 12% July 5.... • • 177% 183% 196% 19% 12%
10.... .. 181% 186% 198% 17 11% 11.... 174 182 195% 21% 13%
17.... . . 182 186% 197% 15% 11 18.... 177 181% 195 18 13%
24.... . . 183 197% 14% 25.... . . 178% 194% 16%
31.... 184 199% 15% Aug. 1 180 195% 15%
Aug. 7 . . 184 199 15 8.... . . 182 197% 15%
14.... 185 199 14 15.... 181 196% 15%
21....
. . 185 199 14 22.... 181 197% 16%
28....
.
. 187 200% 13% 29.... 183 197% 14%
Sept. 4 . . 189 201% 12% Sept. 6 185 197% 13%
11.... . . 188 200% 12% 12.... . . 189 197% 8%
18....
.
. 188 200% 12% 19.... .. 187 197% 10%
25.... 188 199 11 26.... . . 188% 198% 10%
Oct. 2 . . .
.
. . 190% 200% 10% Oct. 3 . . . . 191 199% 8%
9.... 191 200% 9% 10.... 191 199% 8%
16....
. . 193 202 9 17.... 188 200% 12%
23.... .. 195 204% 9% 24.... 187 201% 14%
30.... . . 194 204% 10% 31.... 189 203% 14%
Nov. 6 . . 196 203% 7% Nov. 7.... . . 189 204% 15%
13.... . . 198 206% 8% 14.... 187 203% 16%
20.... 196 203% 7% 21.... . . 185 203% 18%
27.... 194 203% 9% 28.... 186 204% 18%
Dec. 4
. . 192 203% 11% Dec. 5 187 205% 18%
11.... 191 201% 10% 12... . . . 189 207 18
18.... 192 201% 9% 19.... . . 187 205% 18%
24....
.
. 194 203% 9% 27.... 190 207% 17%
31.... . . 196 204% 8%
1961
1960 Jan. 3.... . . 192 208% 16%
Jan. 8 . . 197 204% 7% 9.... 194 211 17
15.... . . 196 202% 6% 16.... 192 210% 18%
22.... 195 202% 7% 23 ...
.
193 211% 18%
29.... .
. 195% 200% 5% 30.... . . 196 215% 19%
Feb. 5.... 194 198% 4% Feb. 6.... . . 194% 213% 19%
12....
. . 198 200% 2% 13.... . . 189% 209 19%
19.... 194 199% 5% 20.... . . 192% 211% 18%
26....
.
. 197 197% 0% 27.... . . 190 209% 19%
Mar. 4....
.
.
198 198% 0% . . 189 208% 19%
11....
.
. 199 199% 0% 13 .. 188 208% 20%
18 201 203 2 20 187 207 20
(Table is concluded on next page)
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East-
Date
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
1961 Crop
1961
Jan. 3 .. 169 189% 20%
10.... . . 170 190% 20%
17.... 170 19034 20%
24.... . . 172 191% 19%
31.... .. 173 193% 20%
Feb. 7.... 170 191% 21%
14.... 172 192% 20%
21.... . . 172 192% 20%
28.... . . 176 197% 21%
Mar. 7.... . . 172 191% 19%
14.... . . 174 191 17
21.... . . 174 189% 15%
28.... 169 188% 19%
April 4.... . . 174 188% 14%
11...
.
174 187% 13%
18.... 172 186% 14%
25.... .. 174 188% 14%
May 2 . . 174 188% 14%
9... . . . 172 187 15
16.... . . 173 188 202% 15 14%
23 ... 173 186% 201 13% 14%
31.... . . 172% 186 200% 13% 14%
June 6. . . . .. 174 187% 202 13% 14%
13.... . . 175 187 202% 12 13%
20.... . . 179 189% 205% 10% 16
27.... . . 179 190 205 J4 11 15%
July 5.... . . 183 192% 206% 23% 13%
11.... 181 190% 205% 24% 14%
18.... . . 181% 192% 207% 25% 14%
25.... . . 183% 209% 25%
Aug. 1 . . 185% 209% 23%
8.... . . 187 210% 23%
15.... .. 189% 212% 22%
22.... . . 189 210% 21%
29.... . . 188 208% 20%
Sept. 6.... . . 188% 203% 15%
13.... 190% 205% 15%
20.... . . 189 204% 15%
27.... . . 189 206% 17%
Oct. 3 . . . . . 187 208% 21%
10.... . . 188 208% 20%
17.... 191 209% 18%
24.... . . 196 210% 14%
31.... 194 208% 14%
Nov. 7.... . . 196 209% 13%
14.... 197 209% 12%
21 .. 197 209H 12%
28.... 199 209% 10%
Dec. 5 . . . . . 196 209J4 13%
12.... 197 209% 12%
19.... . . 195 208% 13%
26.... . . 194 206% 12%
1962
Jan. 2 196 206% 10%
9.... 191 207 16
16.... 189 204% 15%
23.... 187 202% 15%
30.... 189 203% 14%
Feb. 6.... 192 203% 11%
13.... 194 202% 8%
20.... 193 200yg 7%
27.... 193 199% 6%
Mar. 6.... 196 202% 6%
13.... . . 195 203% 8%
20.... . . 196% 205% 9%
Date
East-
central
Illinois
farm
price
July March Basis Differ-
ence
9%
9%
9%
9%
10
10
10
10%
10%
9%
Mean 1955-61 Crops
Jan. 3 175% 198% 22%
10 176% 197% 21%
17 175% 197% 22
24 175% 197% 21%
31 175% 197% 22
Feb. 7 174% 197% 22%
14 176% 198 21%
21 176% 198 21%
28 177% 198% 21%
Mar. 7 176% 196% 20%
14 177% 197% 20%
21 176% 196 19%
28 176% 195% 19%
April 4 176% 195% 19%
11 177% 196% 18%
18 176^ 195% 19%
25 176% 195% 19%
May 2 176% 194% 18%
9 175% 193% 18%
16 176% 194% 204 17%
23 176% 193% 203 16%
31 175% 192% 202% 16%
June 6 175% 192 201% 16%
13 176% 193% 203% 16%
20 177% 193% 203% 15%
27 179% 194% 204% 15
July 5 181% 194% 204% 23%
11 181% 195% 205% 24%
18 183% 197% 207 23%
25 182% 205% 23%
Aug. 1 182% 206% 23%
8 182% 206% 23%
15 184 208% 24%
22 184% 207% 23%
29 184% 207% 23%
Sept. 6 186% 208% 22
13 187J6 208% 20%
20 187% 208% 21
27 188 209% 21%
Oct. 3 188% 209% 21%
10 189% 210% 21
17 189% 211% 21%
24 190^ 210% 20%
31 191 212% 21%
Nov. 7 192% 212% 20%
14 192% 213% 20%
21 194% 212% 17%
28 194% 212% 18%
Dec. 5 195% 212 16%
12 196% 212% 16%
19 195% 211% 15%
26 196% 211% 15%
Jan. 2 198% 212% 14%
9 198% 213% 14%
16 198% 212% 14%
23 197% 211% 13H
30 198% 211% 13%
Feb. 6 197% 210% 13%
13 197% 210% 12%
20 198% 211% 12%
27 199% 211% 12%
Mar. 6 199% 213% 13%
13 200% 214% 14%
20 198% 213% 14%
8M—9-63—8060C
5M—5-64—8325J
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